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This research addresses the potential retention and cost impacts of providing 
an optimal individualized portfolio of non-monetary and monetary incentives to 
influence reenlistment and retention behavior in both enlisted Sailors (air traffic 
controller and fire controlmen) and Officers (Surface Warfare Officers). 
Although the idea of flexible benefits packages has been present in corporate 
America since the early sixties and gained popularity by the early eighties 
(Tremblay, Sire & Pelchat, 1998), it is a very recent idea to the US Navy.  The 
military benefits package has long been characterized by a diverse set of benefits 
designed to include several elements that contribute to military readiness or to the 
service members‘ quality of life. It also provides numerous ―benefits‖ that many 
service members do not need, desire, or use.  To paraphrase the Chief of Naval 
Personnel (CNP), VADM Mark E. Ferguson‘s comment at the 2008 Navy Workforce 
Research Conference: Why are we giving childcare benefits to an 18-year-old single 
Sailor with no dependents? (2008). 
By allowing Sailors to choose only those benefits they value more than the 
cost to provide, the Navy can eliminate the waste associated with unwanted or 
undervalued benefits, while at the same time empowering its members by giving 
them a voice in their compensation structures. 
The Navy attempts to obtain desired end-strength by balancing personnel 
losses with accessions and retention.  The retention of qualified experienced Sailors 
has historically been considered a more cost-effective option than recruiting and 
training new accessions to replace those losses—especially those ―in critical skill 
specialties with high training costs or demonstrated retention shortfalls‖ 
(OUSD(P&R), 2005b, p. 610).   
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1. Enlisted Community 
The Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB): 
provides a bonus to enlisted personnel who reenlist in a skill characterized by 
inadequate manning, low retention, and high replacement costs payable to an 
individual with between twenty-one months and sixteen years active service.  
Payment is based on monthly basic pay times a specified award level […] 
times the number of additional years of obligated service. (DoN, 2008, p. 85)  
According to the US Government Accountability Office (GAO), the 
Department of Defense‘s budget ―for the Selective Reenlistment Bonus Program has 
more than tripled […], from $235 million in fiscal year 1997 to an estimated $789 
million in fiscal year 2002‖ (GAO, 2002b, p. 5).  The Navy‘s portion of the SRB funds 
was estimated at $323 million in 2007, $358 million in 2008, and $359 million in 
2009 (DoN, 2008, p. 85).  According to a GAO study in 2005, ―[m]ost [service] 
components […] met their aggregate retention goals in the past 6 fiscal years [2000-
2005], but the Navy experienced retention shortages in fiscal year 2005 […]. The 
Navy did not meet its end-of-year retention goals: for service members with less 
than 6 years of service by about 2 percent and for service members with 6 to 10 
years of service by about 8 percent‖ (GAO, 2005, pp. 8, 11). 
2. Naval Officers 
Targeted bonus pay has been used to meet Officer manning objectives.  
Current bonus pay programs have the common objectives of retaining trained and 
skilled officers while attracting new officers into specific career pipelines.  The 
aviation, nuclear and surface warfare communities are among those Navy career 
fields in which bonuses are currently being implemented.  Each bonus program 
differs in required commitment, bonus pay amount and applicability.  
The aviation community offers Aviation Career Incentive Pay (ACIP), a 
monthly incentive for Officers who hold or are training for an aviation rating or 
designation, and Aviation Career Continuation Pay (ACCP), to encourage qualified 
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aviators who have completed their initial active duty service obligation (ADSO) to 
continue this Navy career path.  The nuclear community offers the following targeted 
bonuses: the Nuclear Accessions Bonus, a signing bonus for officers pursuing a 
career involving Naval nuclear propulsion in the submarine or surface warfare 
community; the Nuclear Career Accessions Bonus, another one-time payment made 
after officers successfully complete the two phases of Naval nuclear propulsion 
training; the Nuclear Officer Continuation Pay (COPAY), a continuation bonus for 
nuclear-trained officers who accept a three-year to five-year contract extension; and 
the Annual Incentive Bonus (AIB), paid to nuclear-qualified officers wishing to 
continue service on an annual basis. 
Of more specific interest to this research, the surface warfare community 
offers surface warfare officers (SWOs) several targeted pay bonuses:  Surface 
Warfare Officer Continuation Pay (SWOCP or ―SWO bonus‖), paid to Officers 
obligating to complete one or more assignments as a Department Head afloat; the 
Junior Surface Warfare Officer Critical Skills Retention Bonus, an addition to the 
SWOCP, pays eligible lieutenants $25,000 to stay in the Navy and in the SWO 
community through the ninth year of commissioned service and 2 Department Head 
tours; The Surface Warfare Officer Critical Skills Bonus, available to LCDRs, pays 
up to $46,000 to remain on active duty in the Surface Warfare Community through 
the 15th year of commissioned service; and the Senior Surface Warfare Officer 
Critical Skills Retention Bonus (Senior SWO Bonus) offers CDRs serving in eligible 
billets a yearly bonus of $15,000 and CAPTs in eligible billets $20,000 per year.  
Nuclear-trained Surface Warfare Officers can receive the nuclear bonuses in 
conjunction with the surface warfare officer bonuses.  Despite these targeted pay 
bonuses, The SWO community has experienced the lowest junior officer retention 
rate of all Unrestricted Line Officer (URL) communities since the early 1990‘s. 
Thus, the Navy is paying significant reenlistment and retention bonuses and 
still not consistently meeting its reenlistment and retention goals.  The system is 
broken and needs to be fixed.  This research will explore one possible ―fix.‖ 
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B. Research Question 
This research addressed the following questions: 
1. Primary Question 
Can a combinatorial auction mechanism providing individualized portfolios of 
non-monetary and monetary incentives more cost-effectively influence reenlistment/ 
retention behavior than monetary incentives alone? 
2. Secondary Questions 
a. What auction design would allow the Navy to tailor monetary/non-monetary 
reenlistment incentive packages to individual Sailors while simultaneously 
economizing on Navy resources? 
b. If both reenlistment incentive programs are optimally designed, what cost 
savings might the Navy expect by moving from purely monetary reenlistment 
incentives to a portfolio of monetary/non-monetary incentives? 
c. How would population representation be affected by these reenlistment 
incentives? 
C. Scope and Limitations  
This report focuses on applying non-monetary incentives in a retention 
auction mechanism to two US Navy enlisted communities and one officer 
community.  It does not address other services nor does it analyze other enlisted or 
officer communities.  However, the general findings may be applicable to all services 
at any pay grade.  
D. Methodology 
The methodology in this research focused on three retention/reenlistment 
mechanisms: a purely monetary auction, a Universal Incentive Package (UIP) 
auction, and the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM).  The latter 
two auctions included various non-monetary incentives (NMIs) that appeared to be 
 5 
 
important to Sailors—according to prior research, as well as survey data garnered 
as part of this research.   
The mechanisms were simulated; their outcomes compared, and their 
respective strengths and weaknesses explored.  The main measure of effectiveness 
(MOE) was total cost to the Navy.  This measure assumed constant reenlistment 
goals across mechanisms.  The models, however, can easily be adapted to reflect a 
constant total cost assumption, with increasing/decreasing retention rate as the 
MOE.   
A Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) student MBA project team conducted a 
survey asking Surface Warfare Officers (SWOs) what monetary bonus they would 
require to retain in the Navy for two Department Head tours (Denmond, Johnson, 
Lewis & Zegley, 2007).  They were then asked how much of that money they would 
be willing to give up for certain non-monetary benefits.  The non-monetary benefits 
included home port of choice, platform of choice, billet of choice, geographic 
stability, leave sabbatical (for education and pregnancy) and telecommuting.  
Appendix A contains a copy of the full SWO Retention Survey. 
A follow-on NPS student thesis conducted a similar non-monetary incentive 
survey targeting enlisted Navy personnel—specifically the Air Traffic Controller (AC) 
and Fire Controlman (FC) ratings (Zimmerman, 2008).  Appendix B contains a copy 
of the full Enlisted Retention Survey. 
Information about the Sailors‘ valuation distributions for various non-monetary 
incentives, which was required to run the simulations, was not available.  Thus, the 
survey was administered to obtain the necessary data.  The survey method chosen 
provided quick turnaround time, ease of data collection, and uniformity of response 
format. 
The data obtained from the SWO and Enlisted Retention Surveys was used in 
the simulations to estimate the performance of the three retention auctions.  There is 
little to no information currently available regarding the cost to the Navy of the non-
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monetary incentives (NMIs) offered.  The cost of the offerings was estimated based 
on the value distributions gleaned from the survey responses. 
A mathematical simulation of the three auctions was created using Microsoft 
Excel and Oracle Crystal Ball.  The model predicted individual retention outcomes, 
benefits received, total and per-Sailor cost to the Navy for the monetary-only, UIP, 
and CRAM auctions. 
Two cost-estimation techniques were used, labeled Varying Percentile cost– 
All Positive (VP(AP)) and Varying Percentile cost–High Positive (VP(HP)).  These 
costing models will be described in Chapter VI. 
The final product is a program that is applicable to any community (enlisted or 
officer, surface or aviation) by simply changing the offerings and associated 
reservation values. 
Survey questions provided the respondents an opportunity to answer in an 
open text format.  Chapter IV summarizes and discusses these responses. 
E. Organization of Study 
This research is an on-going investigation into the cost-effectiveness of 
offering monetary/non-monetary reenlistment retention packages, or flexible benefits 
packages, to naval personnel. 
Chapter II of this report reviews the auction design literature to identify the 
right mechanism for setting retention incentives and to consider how participants 
would respond to these mechanisms.  Chapter III investigates how civilian 
corporations have pursued and implemented non-monetary benefit offerings.  
Chapter III also considers whether individuals can handle the complexities and 
volume of decisions required for the combinatorial auction mechanism proposed in 
this research. 
Chapter IV addresses the SWO and Enlisted Retention Surveys, including 
administration, target population, sample statistics, and open-text responses.  
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Chapter V outlines the auction mechanisms‘ format and implementation.  Chapter VI 
presents the auction simulations and results.  Chapter VII discusses potential 
diversity implications of the CRAM for the enlisted population.  Chapter VIII provides 
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II. Auction Theory 
Presently, the size or amounts of the Selected Reenlistment Bonuses are 
predetermined in ―response to market forces as retention changes in ratings, NECs, 
and skills‖ (Chief of Naval Operations, 2007).  Specifically, planners at the Naval 
Bureau of Personnel determine which ratings and Navy Enlisted Classifications 
(NECs) qualify as undermanned, as suffering from low retention or as having high 
replacement costs. They then determine the level of cash bonus at which the Navy 
can expect ―a reasonable prospect of enough improvement in retention in response 
to the award to justify the cost‖ (2007).  This determination is made primarily through 
use of the Annualized Cost of Leaving Model (ACOL). This model theorizes that 
individuals compare their projected Military earnings stream with their possible 
civilian earnings stream plus their taste for civilian life to determine whether to 
continue military service (Hansen & Wenger, 2005, p. 33).1  By using this model, 
planners derive the estimated minimum SRB amount that would induce the requisite 
number of Sailors to stay in the Navy.   
A. Cost of Retention Mechanism Currently Used by the Navy 
By using a predetermined SRB amount as described above, Navy planners 
are actually attempting to determine the marginal SRB required by the final (or most 
reluctant) Sailor that must reenlist to meet end-strength targets.  Unfortunately, all 
previous (or more-willing) Sailors must also receive this amount under the current 
system, as shown in Figure 1. 
If planners underestimate the optimal SRB level (i.e., set the bonus too low), 
too few Sailors will be willing to retain; the Navy will not meet end-strength goals, 
and readiness will suffer.  If planners overestimate the optimal SRB level (i.e., set 
the bonus too high), too many Sailors will want to retain and the Navy could 
overshoot its end-strength goals.  This would result in budget overages.  
                                            
1 Hansen and Wenger suggest including ―basic pay, allowances for subsistence and housing, and 
retirement pay [... and any] SRB for which the individual is eligible.‖ 
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Alternatively, if the bonus was set above the optimal SRB level, reenlistments could 
be suspended once end-strength was reached.  This would be sub-optimal, as 
retention would be first-come first-served—heavily favoring those whose end of 
active obligated service (EAOS) falls in the first half of the fiscal year.  This would be 
unfair to those with later EAOS dates, and it would not retain those Sailors 
(regardless of EAOS date) who are most willing to remain in the Navy, raising later 
retention costs. 
 
Figure 1. Cost of Existing SRB Determination 
The green line in Figure 2 represents the labor supply curve or Sailors‘ 
reservation costs to remain in the Navy.  The blue line represents the optimal SRB.  
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Figure 2. Predetermined SRB Challenges 
This report will illustrate an auction mechanism that endogenously determines 
the precise (and minimum) SRB level necessary to induce the right number of 
reenlistments and overcome the flaws of the current system.  Theoretically, a 
retention auction would not only set the market-clearing SRB level for the current 
labor supply and demand conditions, but would also identify the Sailors to be 
retained. 
B. Auction Design 
The Encarta Dictionary defines an auction as, ―a sale of goods or property at 
which intending buyers bid against one another for individual items, each of which is 
sold to the bidder offering the highest price.‖  This actually defines the most widely 
understood auction: a forward auction.  There are numerous variations on this 
common type of auction, some of which will be discussed in the following sections.  
 
Optimal SRB











Figure 3. Auction Variations  
An auction is, more precisely, ―an exchange mechanism‖ that allocates 
resources to the winning bidder.  Whether the winner is buying or selling, how many 
winners there are, and the price the winner pays or receives is determined by the 
auction variation. 
1. Auction Variations 
This section will discuss some of the most common auction variations, 
specifically those germane to this research.  Additionally, an introduction to the 














Figure 4. Common Auction Variations  
a. Single-winner Forward and Reverse Auctions 
In a forward, single-winner auction, there is one seller and multiple buyers.  
The winner is the highest bidder.  This is the most widely known type of auction.  A 
reverse, single-winner auction is characterized by multiple sellers and one buyer.  
An example of this is the competition for government contracts.  The winner is the 
lowest bidder.  
For simplicity, the following auction types will be described using a forward, 
single-winner auction—unless otherwise noted. 
b. Open-bid vs. Sealed-bid Auctions 
Open-bid auctions are those in which bidders openly declare their bid 
amounts or intentions.  Open-bid auctions can be ascending (English auction).  The 
bidding starts at a minimum price, and the auctioneer increases the bid 
incrementally until there are no more takers.  They can also be descending (Dutch 
auctions).  The auctioneer starts at a predetermined price (high enough so that no 
bidder is interested) and decreases incrementally until a bidder accepts that price. 
Sealed-bid auctions are those in which bid amounts are submitted (often in a 
roughly simultaneous fashion) without any disclosure until after the winner is 
determined. Sealed-bid auctions come in two common variations.  In a first-price 
 
Reverse AuctionsForward Auctions








auction, the winner is the highest bidder, and the winner pays the amount bid.  In a 
second-price (Vickrey) auction, the winner is still the highest bidder; the price the 
winner pays, however, is the bid of the next highest (or first excluded) bidder.   
c. Reverse, Second-price, Sealed-bid Auction 
Given the retention context, this thesis will focus on reverse auctions.  In a 
reverse auction, there is only one buyer (for example, the Navy) and many sellers or 
bidders (the Sailors offering their services).  While the results of this thesis 
generalize to other reverse auction formats, the focus will be on reverse, second-
price, sealed-bid auctions. In a reverse, second-price auction, the lowest bidder 
provides the goods or services (military labor in this case), but at the price of the first 
excluded (next highest) bidder. 
There will be further discussion of the specific auction formats analyzed in 
Chapter IV.  
d. Bidding Strategy: Second-price Auction  
Under a second-price auction, the optimal bidding strategy is to bid one‘s true 
valuation. For example, if an individual is bidding for an item valued at $30 
(representing a maximum willingness to pay of $30 for the item), then the best 
strategy is to bid exactly $30 for the item in a second-price auction. 
To understand this result more clearly, this section will illustrate how one can 
never do better than bidding truthfully in a second-price auction. For simplicity, the 
explanation that follows employs the following notation: 
V = Participant‘s value for the object 
P = Price paid for the object 
S = Participants surplus 
B = Participants bid for the object 
H = Highest bid submitted by any other bidder 
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The following section will first demonstrate that bidding above your true value 
(i.e., choosing B > V) can only hurt you.  It will then demonstrate that bidding below 
your true value (i.e., choosing B < V) can only hurt you.  Figure 5 illustrates the three 
possible cases or outcomes which can result from bidding above your true value.  
Figure 6 illustrates the three possible cases or outcomes which can result from 
bidding below your true value. 
 
Figure 5. Bidding above Your Valuation  
For all cases, the reader should note that the participant‘s objective as a 
bidder is to maximize your surplus, S.  If you do not submit the highest bid (i.e., if B < 
H), then S = 0.  If you do submit the highest bid (i.e., if B > H), then P = H, and your 
surplus is given by S = V – P = V – H. 
Case A1: H > B > V 
In this case, because H > B, you are not the high bidder and you do not win 
the object; therefore S = 0.  If you bid truthfully (B = V), you also do not win the 
object (because H > V) and, therefore, would also have S = 0.  Thus, bidding above 
your true value provides no benefit in this case. 
Case A2: B > V > H 
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In this case, because B > H, you are the high bidder and win the object; 
therefore S = V – H > 0.  If you bid truthfully (B = V), you also win the object 
(because V > H) and, therefore, would also have S = V - H.  Thus, bidding above 
your true value provides no benefit in this case, either. 
Case A3: B > H > V 
In this case, because B > H, you are the high bidder and win the object; 
therefore S = V – H, which is negative, because H > V: you ―win‖ the object, but pay 
more than it is worth to you.  If you bid truthfully (B = V), on the other hand, you 
would not win the object (because H > V) and, therefore, would have S = 0.  Thus, 
bidding above your true value hurts you in this case.  You would be better off bidding 
truthfully. 
 
Figure 6. Bidding below Your Valuation 
Case B1: H > V > B 
In this case, because H > B, you are not the high bidder and do not win the 
object; therefore S = 0.  If you bid truthfully (B = V), you also do not win the object 
(because H > V) and, therefore, would also have S = 0.  Bidding below your true 
value provides no benefit in this case. 
Case B2: V > B > H 
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In this case, because B > H, you are the high bidder and win the object; 
therefore S = V – H > 0.  If you bid truthfully (B = V), you also win the object 
(because V > H) and, therefore, would also have S = V – H.  Thus, bidding below 
your true value provides no benefit in this case. 
Case B3: V > H > B 
In this case, because H > B, you are not the high bidder and do not win the 
object; therefore S = 0.  If you bid truthfully (B = V), you would win the object 
(because V > H) and, therefore, would have S = V – H.  This is positive because V > 
H.  Thus, bidding below your true value hurts you in this case.  You would be better 
off bidding truthfully. 
This demonstrates that bidding anything other than your true value in a 
second-price auction can only hurt you.  Under this auction format, truthful revelation 
(B = V) is the optimal bidding strategy. 
e. Bidding Strategy: First-Price Auction  
Under a first-price auction, it is immediately apparent that truthful revelation 
(B = V) is NOT the optimal bidding strategy. If you are the high bidder (i.e., if B > H) 
under a first-price auction, you will win the object, but the price you pay will be the 
amount you bid (i.e., P = B).  Therefore, you will earn no surplus (S = V – P = V – B 
= V – V = 0).  Instead, the optimal strategy is to bid some amount below your true 
value (i.e., to bid B < V). 
By how much should you ―underbid‖ your true value in a first-price auction?  
To answer this question, consider that if all bidders underbid their true values by the 
same fraction or amount (or, more generally, according to the same underbidding or 
discounting rule), the winning bidder will always be the bidder with the highest value 
for the object. 
Because S = V – P = V – B only if you win the object, and S = 0 otherwise, 
the amount you bid only matters if you win the object. This means that you might as 
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well bid as if you are the winning bidder, i.e., the bidder with the highest value for the 
object. 
Identifying the optimal bidding strategy in a first-price auction boils down to 
answering the following question: if you have the highest value for the object among 
all bidders, how low can you bid and still win the object?  The answer is that you can 
bid as low as the second highest bid, which you can safely assume will be at or 
below the second highest value for the object.  Thus, the optimal bidding strategy 
(technically, the ―equilibrium‖ bidding strategy) in a first-price auction is to bid what 
you expect the next highest value would be if your value for the object was the 
highest value among all bidders. 
f. Revenue Equivalence  
One interesting and important implication of the above-described optimal 
bidding strategies is that, on average, the seller of the object can expect to receive 
the same revenue—whether the object is sold via first-price or second-price auction. 
To see this, note that the price (or revenue) in a second-price auction will be 
equal to the second-highest bid.  Because the optimal bidding strategy is to bid 
truthfully, this will be equal to the second-highest value.  Under a first-price auction, 
the price (or revenue) will be equal to the absolute highest bid.  In equilibrium, the 
high bidder in a first-price auction will bid what he expects to be the second-highest 
value. 
Thus, under either auction format, the expected price is equal to the expected 
second-highest valuation.  Thus, in general, the expected revenue for the seller 
under either auction format is the same. 
C. Prior Thesis Work 
Hudson (2006) addressed the choice between a first- and second-price 
auction design with respect to the Navy‘s Targeted Separation Incentive Program.  
He found that the second-price, sealed-bid auction ―is the most efficient manner to 
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conduct separation auctions because of its efficiency, cost effectiveness, equitability 
and practicality, based on recent market design and auction theory‖ (p. 38).   
Bock (2007) applied a two-stage auction mechanism, called the Sequential 
Self Selection Auction Mechanism (S3AM), to Marine Corps Reenlistments.  He 
estimated the potential cost savings by properly determining Selected Reenlistment 
Bonus levels.  He showed further cost savings from using a two-stage auction in 
which bidders have an incentive to reveal when they are more willing to retain.  In 
this self-selecting, two-stage auction mechanism, Sailors more willing to retain will 
select a lower, but longer-term bonus as opposed to a higher, but riskier bonus.   
Norton (2007) designed an experiment to determine whether this sequential 
auction would be truth-revealing and successfully separate more-willing-to-retain 
Sailors from less-willing-to-retain Sailors.  The experiment also indicated whether 
participants would be able to accurately determine their optimal bidding strategy 
without prior training and education on the subject.  Cook (2008) analyzed these 
experiments and found that most participants quickly determined the most beneficial 
strategy (truthful revelation) and adopted it consistently.  With the two-stage 
mechanism, the employer (Navy) recaptured approximately 25% - 30% of the 
employees‘ (Sailors‘) surplus compared to a single-stage auction. 
Tan (2006) applied a two-sided matching mechanism with money to the Sailor 
assignment problem.  This mechanism determines Assignment Incentive Pay 
bonuses to attract Sailors to hard-to-fill jobs.  The assignment bonus reflects 
preferences on both sides of the market: the Sailors‘ preferences over jobs and the 
jobs‘ preferences over Sailors.  Using Monte Carlo simulation to model the process, 
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III. Determining Offerings 
The major advantage to a solely pecuniary compensation system is its 
simplicity: cash pay is easy to identify and quantify.  Few compensation plans, 
however, are this simple.  It is to the employee‘s advantage to have a portion of his 
wages consist of non-monetary benefits.  Savings achieved through economies of 
scale and corporate tax deductions in health care plans is an example.  Paid 
vacation and sick days are another example of non-cash benefits that work to the 
advantage of the employee.  Hattiangadi (2001) notes that ―nearly 80 percent of 
surveyed workers say that benefits are very important in their decision to accept or 
reject a job‖ (p. 8).  According to the Bureau of Labor and Statistics, the percentage 
of employees in medium and large companies with access to flexible benefits 
increased from 5% in 1988 to 13% in 1999 (GAO, 2002a, p. 57).  In 2006, that 
number had risen to 28% of companies that employ 100 or more people (TED, 
2007). 
The Chief of Naval Operations has defined recognition of the Navy as a top 
50 employer in the United States as one of his goals for 2008 (Roughead, 2008).  By 
examining the effort of leaders in Corporate America, the Navy can adapt and adopt 
their best practices to achieve this goal. 
A. Corporate Non-monetary Incentive Efforts 
1. Total Rewards 
The Corporate Leadership Council (CLC) suggests implementing a Total 
Rewards philosophy with respect to compensation.  ―A Total Rewards philosophy is 
a strategic means of merging the roles of the compensation and benefits function.  
This approach focuses on the monetary and non-monetary incentives used to 




Figure 7. Components of a Total Rewards Philosophy 
(Corporate Leadership Council, 2008b, p. 2) 
They define a total rewards package as being comprised of all of the reasons 
why ―a talented individual would want to work and remain at a company‖ (2008b, p. 
2).  This philosophy must be clearly defined and shared with organizational 
employees.  Employees must know that the purpose of Total Rewards is to ―focus 
on serving the workforce, as well as organizations‘ business objectives‖ (2008b, p. 
3).  Additionally, employees must be educated as to the true value of their total 
compensation. 
This final point is especially relevant to the Navy.  Hattiangadi notes that 
―[c]urrently, information about the various benefits offered to military personnel and 
their families is scattered among an array of websites and publications.  Most 
private-sector companies offer materials of this type, so such a move would facilitate 
comparison of offered private-sector and military compensation packages‖ 
(Hattiangadi, 2001, p. 127). 
2. Navy-civilian Comparison Message  
The Navy attempts to achieve employee recognition of benefits by releasing 
an annual message that compares military earnings with their civilian equivalents.  
While this is a worthwhile endeavor, it may not have the desired impact.  Most 
Sailors are unaware of the true value of the Navy‘s compensation package.  By 
implementing a benefits system in which Sailors choose to keep and reject various 
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non-monetary benefits, they will be forced to examine and understand the value of 
their compensation packages. 
A recent Naval Message (Chief of Naval Operations, 2008) illustrates the 
significance of benefits in the overall military compensation package when compared 
to similar civilian occupations: 
A Petty Officer Second Class Aviation Mechanic [AM2] stationed in 
Norfolk with two dependents and over four years of service[‘s] […] 
military gross annual salary is approximately 46,487 dollars as 
compared to a private sector counterpart at approximately 43,790 
dollars.  Breaking down the Petty Officer‘s total annual salary, this 
Sailor is making about 3,533 dollars in BAS [Basic Allowance for 
Subsistence], 15,324 dollars in BAH (w/dependents)[Basic Allowance 
for Housing with dependents], 680 dollars clothing maintenance, and 
base pay of 26,968 dollars.  Unlike her private sector counterpart, the 
Petty Officer receives a tax break because allowances such as BAH 
and BAS are not subject to Federal Income Tax.  This tax advantage 
increases the value of the Petty Officer‘s annual salary by 5,721 
dollars.  As a civilian, the Aviation Mechanic in this example would 
have to earn about 52,000 dollars to have a comparable after-tax 
income.  This amount does not include annual indirect compensation 
attained such as medical, dental, vision and commissary benefits 
which add up to approximately 6,785 dollars. (Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2008)   
This message also points out the defined-benefits retirement plan that is 
provided at no direct cost to the member: 
If this same Sailor makes an informed decision and decides to stay 
Navy and retire after 24 years as a Senior Chief Petty Officer, she can 
expect […] [under the] High-3 Military Retirement, payout over 40 
years of over five million dollars.  As a civilian [she] would have to 
accrue 2,652,892 dollars at the time of retirement to receive a 
comparable payout.  In order to achieve this amount, [she] would have 
to invest 57,972 dollars annually at an eight percent return over a 20-
year period. (Chief of Naval Operations, 2008) 
3. Example: The Royal Bank of Scotland 
The Corporate Leadership Council (CLC) analyzed the Royal Bank of 
Scotland‘s (RBS) efforts when introducing a flexible benefits plan to its employees.  
RBS offered flexibility in existing medical and dental coverage, various levels of 
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group rate additional insurance policies, childcare vouchers, discounted retail 
vouchers, and the opportunity to buy or sell vacation days among many other 
benefits.  They determined the mix of offerings based on employee focus groups, 
questionnaires, and manager interviews.  They defined the advantages of a flexible 
benefits program at RBS, as shown in Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8. Advantages to RBS Flexible Benefits Plan  
(Corporate Leadership Council, 2008a) 
CLC found that RBS met all of its objectives by introducing the plan.  RBS 
achieved significant employee participation, employee satisfaction, recognition as an 
employer of choice in the United Kingdom, and company satisfaction in terms of 




4. Employee Satisfaction, Communication and Distributive Justice 
Another important question is how flexible benefit plans affect employee 
satisfaction.  More satisfied employees are more likely to stay at a company and 
require less monetary incentives (Ehrenberg & Smith, 2008).  This reduces retention 
and turnover costs.  Tremblay et al. (1998) attempted to determine what influences 
employee satisfaction and, more specifically, how flexible benefit plans influence 
employee satisfaction.  They linked these research objectives to the organizational 
goals ―to maintain satisfaction levels and at the same time control costs‖ (1998).  
They further refined their research objectives by presenting and testing nine 
hypotheses: 
1. The more importance individuals attach to benefits, the more satisfied they 
will be with those benefits. 
2. There is a positive relationship between inter-organizational mobility and 
benefit satisfaction. 
3. There is a positive relationship between perception of security and 
satisfaction with benefits. 
4. There is a positive relationship between the perception of distributive 
justice and benefit satisfaction. 
5. The perceived importance of benefits plays a moderator role in the 
relationship between distributive justice and benefit satisfaction.  
6. There is a positive relationship between the perception of involvement in 
decisions related to benefits and benefit satisfaction. 
7. There is a positive relationship between the perception that employee 
preferences are considered and benefit satisfaction.  
8. There is a positive relationship between communication received and 
benefit satisfaction. 
9. There is a positive relationship between flexibility of benefits and benefits 
satisfaction. (Tremblay et al., 1998, pp. 671-676) 
To test these hypotheses, the authors examined the effects of three distinctly 
different benefit plans: a traditional Fixed-benefits plan employed by an insurance 
company, a Modular Flexible plan (different benefit bundles to choose from) used by 
 26 
 
a University, and a Core-plus plan (a core group of essential benefits plus other 
options that employees can add to the core) used by a drinks manufacturing 
company.  They surveyed employees in each firm to capture the employees‘ 
perceptions of fairness, communication, security, and flexibility of benefits with 
respect to job satisfaction.  By comparing these three types of plans, they were able 
to examine the effects of each level of flexibility—from none to maximum—to test 
their hypotheses. 
They cite various studies that suggest that by introducing employee flexibility 
and choice, employers will simultaneously increase employee satisfaction and 
control the rising costs of providing benefits—especially health care. 
The authors incorporate demographic controls in their model and, 
additionally, include variables designed to capture the concepts described in the 
hypotheses—such as benefit importance, perception of distributive justice, level of 
participation in the decision, and communication level of the organization.  They 
obtained these measures through the survey given to employees in the three firms. 
Their choice of three distinctly different firms was questionable.  They note 
that ―some differences in respondent profiles emerged from the data‖ (Tremblay, 
1998, p. 676).  They report a high response rate, 42.2%, but fail to mention how 
representative that response was except to state that it was not entirely in keeping 
with the individual firm profiles.  This leads the reader to question how applicable 
these findings are to the rest of the business community.  
They were highly successful in establishing an argument for further research 
into flexible benefits packages and their impact on employee satisfaction, cost 
reduction, and attraction of non-traditional employees.  Of the nine hypotheses, five 
were confirmed; one was refuted and three had inconclusive findings.  They found 
communication to be the most influential aspect of benefits satisfaction. This was 
followed by perception of distributive justice.   
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This research reveals the tremendous potential of flexible benefits packages.  
It also underscores the necessity to communicate the scope of the company‘s 
benefits offerings and to establish faith in the fairness of benefits allocation.  To 
make an informed decision between employment opportunities, employees must be 
aware of the entirety of their compensation package. 
Tremblay et al. (1998) also found some evidence to suggest that individuals 
value the ability to choose as highly as the actual choices themselves (Van Boening, 
Blackstone, MckKee, Rutstrom, 2006). But can people handle such a large volume 
of complex choices? 
B. Private-sector Experience 
Ballentine (2003) states that, as with monetary incentives, non-monetary 
incentives need to be tailored to the individual worker.  Ballentine has found that 
younger workers are looking for an increase in workplace satisfaction in terms of 
environment, while older workers are looking more toward their retirement and 
incentives to aid their transition, such as part-time and temporary work opportunities.  
The non-monetary incentives mentioned include sabbaticals, part-time and 
temporary work, feedback from superiors, flexible work schedules, attentive 
employers and professional development. 
Ballentine found that incentive packages differed by age, needs and career 
stage; younger employees were offered packages emphasizing retention while older 
employee were offered packages emphasizing retirement incentives.  However, 
Ballentine stresses that incentives can disrupt the workforce by making employees 
competitive rather than team players and that incentives can decrease job 
satisfaction, interest and motivation. 
Cohen (2006) states that non-monetary incentives can be effective in the 
healthcare profession and can retain employees by increasing their overall 
satisfaction.  The article is based on everyday, small incentives such as professional 
development, ―thank-yous‖ from supervisors, and whole staff recognition by 
employers.  Overall, employees were happy that the culture of the business 
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changed, and they felt they were able to appreciate their job more (based on a 
survey used to measure incentive success).  The managers also found that simple 
incentives were better and easier for all employees and employers. 
Dolan (1996) points out various non-monetary incentives that help major 
private companies—such as Sprint, Disney, and Northern Telecom—retain their 
employees.  Non-monetary incentives were introduced because human intelligence 
has become so much more valuable in the job market.  Companies did not have a 
choice but to give employees more options to attract and retain the best workers.  
Some of the incentives mentioned are on-site laundry service, flex-time/working from 
home, an on-site handyman who is available to do home repairs, on-site public 
schools, and service opportunities.  One worker pointed out that her flex-time 
actually allowed her to work more hours and be more productive because she can 
take care of her family and work during her off time.  Overall, this article points out 
that the employer needs to know its individual employees to provide appropriate 
incentives. 
Falcone (2002) focused on the private finance sector.  He states that 
managers need to provide employees ways of increasing their internal motivation to 
motivate and retain them.  To do this, he believes that employers should provide 
professional development opportunities outside of the company and give employees 
tools to self-evaluate, be it in writing or in group sessions. 
Simms (2007) from the UK‘s People Management, defines non-monetary as 
non-cash, meaning that the incentive is not employee payment but can cost the 
company money.  Simms notes a survey that found 38.6 percent of employees 
improved their performance when given non-monetary (non-cash) incentives, while 
only 14.6 percent improved with monetary incentives.  Simms gives various 
examples of non-monetary incentives such as employee parties, employee award 
ceremonies, parking spaces for hard workers, flexible work schedules and longer 
maternity leave.  As in previous articles, Simms found that non-monetary incentives 
rely heavily on knowing the employee‘s individual needs. 
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In another article, Warren (2006b) explains that non-monetary incentives are 
considered to be ―experience incentives.‖  These are similar to non-cash incentives 
in that though the employee does not receive any money, the incentive does cost 
the company money.  Employees are able to earn experiences such as a trip to 
China, part ownership of a private jet, and backstage passes to rock concerts.  
Companies in the UK have found that ―experience incentives‖ have increased 
employee motivation and performance.  Before beginning any incentive program, the 
author points out that the business should have a clearly defined business goal—
such as staff attraction and retention, improving internal communication, reinforcing 
brand behavior, igniting sales, increasing productivity, curbing spending, boosting 
customer satisfaction or driving overall efficiency.   
The top non-monetary incentives mentioned by Warren (2006a) are flexible 
hours, working from home and longer vacation leave.  Warren also points out that 
the most popular non-monetary incentives are parking spaces, free medical 
evaluations, gym memberships, paid spa days, on-site massages and laundry 
facilities, take-out kitchens and corporate cottages.  The article states that often 
retaining employees can be as simple as offering positive feedback, recognition and 
a pat on the back. 
Berry (2005) finds that non-financial incentives will increase employee 
retention and performance; the example of non-financial incentives is a family-
friendly work environment. 
Hemsley (2004) plays down the impact of financial incentives, stating that the 
benefits of these incentives die down quickly.  Hemsley argues that to create long-
term employee motivation and retention, employers must offer non-monetary 
incentives such as positive feedback, public recognition and opportunities for hard-
working employees to benefit (e.g., allowed extra time off).  For example, employees 
might earn points by working over-time or being recognized by their peers; these 
points could in turn be accumulated to ―purchase‖ time off or flex time.  This article 
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was accompanied by a website that shows different employee benefits: 
http://www.employeebenefits-confex.co.uk/eb/Default.aspx. 
Appelbaum and Kamal (2000) focus on how small businesses can compete 
with larger businesses to retain employees; they also provide some interesting ideas 
on what a non-monetary incentive involves.  According to the authors, non-monetary 
incentives include flex time, job sharing, a team focus, greater employee autonomy, 
employee recognition, working from home, job clarity and equity in pay and 
expectations.   
Hall (2006) focuses on the building industry and discusses various non-
monetary incentives that have a lot in common with the non-cash incentives and 
―experience incentives‖ discussed earlier.  Hall points out one company using ―way 
to go‖ awards for hard workers.  Each time employees receive this award, they are 
entered into a raffle to win a free dinner.  Employees who stay with the company 
also reach benchmark incentives after 10, 15, and 20 years, such as cruises or 
Hawaiian vacations.  The entire company has a four-an-a-half day work week, 
closing at 1 p.m. on Fridays.  The author points out that this perk not only increases 
work performance and employee retention, but also increases employee 
recruitment. 
The Corporate Leadership Council (2004) indicates that companies use non-
cash incentives, such as jewelry, watches and pins, to reward employees for their 
time spent at the company.  Of six companies presented in this study from the high 
technology, pharmaceutical, banking, and automotive industries, the company with 
the most employees (50,000) spent $525,000 on non-cash incentives.   Employees 
received non-cash incentives with a value of $25- $170 depending on length of 
service.  Incentives included: money clips, desk clocks, desk sets, lead crystal 
bowls, lead crystal decanter sets, Longine brass clocks, silver tea sets and Atmos 
clocks.  All employees were equally eligible to earn all non-monetary rewards, as the 
company wanted the program to be as equitable as possible.  
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The Corporate Leadership Council (2005) indicates helping employees find a 
work-life balance is important to employee retention.  Work-life balance initiatives 
include flexible work schedules, such as a compressed work week (four days with a 
three-day weekend twice a month) and working from home.  Some employers also 
offered various career development incentives, such as conference opportunities, 
job rotations and mentoring programs.  This study also suggested a phased 
retirement program.  This program appeals to middle-aged workers looking toward 
retirement and older workers nearing retirement.  A phased retirement program 
offers a health program linked to post retirement, pension and compensation 
programs, job flexibility and management support.  Retirees who participate in this 
program were more likely to return to the company in some way—as contractors, 
part-time and temporary employees, or as mentors.  According to this research, a 
phased retirement program actually saves a company money because it can rehire 
retirees and save money on training and errors. 
The Corporate Leadership Council (2002) examined telecommuting and 
found that it benefits a company by enhancing recruiting, increasing productivity, 
raising retention rates, lowering real-estate costs, and reducing absenteeism.  The 
council also found several non-quantifiable benefits, including energy conservation, 
increased family involvement, health improvements, increased employee freedom 
and preservation of the environment.  However, the council found several 
quantifiable employer costs for telecommuting, including: computer equipment, 
home office setup, telecommunications, and training.  Non-quantifiable costs 
include: resentment among non-teleworkers, failure to foster company loyalty, 
inconveniences to managers and hindering of teamwork.   
Before introducing telecommuting, employers should set up a telecommuting 
policy which details costs, benefits, guidelines and disciplinary actions.  Employers 
should also have a team of telecommuting supervisors and trainers.  Johnson and 
Johnson provides an example of a telecommuting policy.  Employees sit through a 
90-minute orientation video on telecommunication.  Employees also discuss how to 
measure their success, how to set up a home office and how to use technology to 
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communicate with others.  Johnson and Johnson uses an intensive process to teach 
its employees how to telecommute and how to balance family life with work life when 
they are working from home to maximize employee success. 
C. Confronting the Complexity of Incentive Choices 
Van Boening et al. (2006, p. 511) conducted ―individual-choice decision-cost‖ 
experiments to investigate the idea that flexible benefit plans have the potential to 
increase job satisfaction and retention.  They posit that employees must perceive the 
new plan as more valuable and be willing and able to select the optimal combination 
of offerings.  To test their hypothesis, the authors conducted ―an experiment on 
choices over stylized benefits packages where discrete goods have multiple 
attributes affecting the payoff function‖ (2006, p. 511).  The hypothesis tested was 
that individuals would be able to make ―payoff-maximizing decisions in the presence 
of multiple attributes […]. In effect, solve a complex programming problem‖ (2006, p. 
512).  The authors further theorized that subjects would develop heuristics to cope 
with these complex situations.  This hypothesis was based on previous research 
aimed at determining whether ―human decision making is intrinsically prone to errors 
[or] that it is fundamentally efficient‖ (2006, p. 512). 
The experiments were conducted at the Mississippi research Laboratory at 
the University of Mississippi and the Business, Economics, Accounting, and 
Marketing Laboratory at the University of South Carolina.  The subjects included 80 
student volunteers from the respective Universities‘ undergraduate business 
schools.  No mention is made as to the demographic characteristics or selection 
method of the volunteers.  However, the statistical model used for hypothesis testing 
included 79 individual dummy variables to cancel out potential individual biases. 
The experiment consisted of a game designed to mimic the choices required 
to maximize payoff and satisfaction from a flexible benefits package.  The objective 
was to choose the optimal combination of cells to achieve a payoff higher than the 
fixed payoff option.   
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The payoff from the game was the reward from selecting a certain number of 
cells.  The subjects were aware at all times of the fixed payoff amount from declining 
to play the game (no effort), the maximum payoff from playing the game and 
individual values relating to the choices and their weights on the final payoff.  The 
subjects also knew the time remaining and the payoff they had achieved as a result 
of their choices.  They could select and deselect as many cells as they wished in the 
four-minute time limit.  They were given a maximum cell value sum with which to 
achieve the optimal payoff from playing the game and were aware of the current cell 
value sum at all times.  They could also choose the fixed payoff option at any time 
during the four-minute round.  This design approximates the choices and constraints 
an individual might face when choosing his options under a flexible benefits plan. 
The experiment consisted of a ―2x2 design with [individual] cell payoff and 
fixed payoff option as the treatment variables‖ (2006, p. 512).  The treatment 
variables were chosen to ensure the ―variety of choices within a given matrix and the 
variety of optimal solutions across matrices [was] sufficiently rich for data analysis‖ 
(2006, p. 515).  Other variables were kept constant to keep the ―computational 
difficulty facing the subject […] significant, but not overwhelming‖ (2006, p. 515).   
In each round, the subjects were given the option of ―playing a ‗cell selection‘ 
game or accepting a known fixed payoff in lieu of playing the game.‖  Only 4% 
overall chose to take the fixed payoff.  The low percentage of people selecting the 
fixed payoff ―suggests that typical subject‘s decision cost [of playing the game] is 
substantially less than 20[%] of the maximum payoff‖ (2006, p. 518).  It also 
suggests that ―the typical subject places a high implicit valuation on the flexibility in 
making choices as she is apparently confident in her ability to exceed the fixed 
payoff‖ (Van Boening et al., 2006, p. 523). 
In 84% of rounds, subjects earned at least 90% of maximum payoff.  When 
the cell payoff was low—20 versus 100 points per cell—the majority of subjects 
earned in the 97-100% range.  ―A relatively low cell payoff implies that cell value is 
more important in determining reward‖ (2006, p. 520).  Therefore, for those that 
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place relatively low value on the number of benefits they receive, the individual value 
of those benefits is extremely important. 
There was weak evidence that the higher the fixed payoff alternative, the 
more the subject earns.  This has an interesting implication.  The rules of the 
experiment were analogous to allowing employees to have the option of keeping 
their fixed benefits plan while shopping for the flexible plan.  The authors suggest 
that the higher the perceived value of the traditional plan, the more likely it is that the 
optimal flexible plan will be discovered by the employee. 
The authors identify three simple heuristics that the subjects developed: 
 ―H:‖ Subjects focus on high cell values (700-1000); low number (<3) of cells 
selected; and decision cost: LOW / Payoff: LOW. 
 ―M:‖ Subjects focus on medium cell values (350-750); 4-5 selected per round; 
and decision Cost/Payoff: between H and L. 
 ―L:‖ Subjects focus on low cell values (100-350); >6 cells selected per round; 
and decision Cost: HIGH /Payoff: HIGH. (2006, p. 521) 
At least 60% of subjects appeared to have used the L heuristic (high payoff 
with high decision cost) in each session; 50% fit into the category overall (meaning 
they used it every time); and less than 10% used the H heuristic (low decision 
cost/low payoff) in each session (only 5% used it every time) (2006, p. 522).  This 
suggests that the majority of the people find the potential gain outweighs the mental 
effort required to complete the task. 
In their book Modern Labor Economics, Ehrenberg and Smith note that 
―employers will tailor their compensation packages to suit the preferences of the 
workers they are trying to attract‖ (2008, p. 269).  Van Boening, et al.‘s model (2006) 
allows the employer to offer a menu of choices and the employees to choose which 
options suit them.  This theory goes on to suggest that the mere presence of a 
choice is itself a benefit and that a ―flexible benefits package may be strongly 
preferred to a pre-defined benefits package‖ (2006, p. 523). 
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The model does not suggest what these benefits should be.  Rather, it is up 
to the employer to tailor offerings to suit target employees.  The literature suggests 
the benefits‘ respective values will differ between individuals.  This seems to be a 
reasonable assumption, and the model allows for this by varying the treatment 
variables and providing choices between the cell values in a substantial range. 
Because most subjects chose to play the game and exceeded the fixed 
payoff value, the results demonstrate that a flexible benefits package will increase 
employee job satisfaction.  This will aid employers in retention and possibly attract a 
larger applicant pool from which to draw.  The Navy could benefit from such a plan.  
This is based on the following conclusions from this study: 
1. People value having choice almost as much as they value the choices 
themselves. 
2. People achieve a higher payoff when the fixed payoff is relatively high, but 
less valuable than the flexible plan‘s payoff. This suggests that employers 
should offer a fixed plan with comparable, but less valuable offerings, in 
addition to the flexible plan. (2006, p. 523) 
Most people are willing to exert the mental effort to exceed the no-effort 
reward—even if the easy (fixed) payoff is 80% of the possible complex-effort payoff. 
People can easily handle this complex decision-making task.  The subjects, 
however, were college students.  To determine applicability to the Navy enlisted 
community and to determine if there are significant differences, a similar experiment 
should be run on high-school graduates, non-high-school graduates, and alternative 
degree holders. 
D. Identifying the Best Non-monetary Incentive Offerings 
The study by Denmond et al. (2007) represents the starting point for 
determining which incentives to include in the SWO and Enlisted Retention Survey 
and the subsequent simulated retention auctions. Their results showed the top non-
monetary compensation attracters for Surface Warfare Officers to be: increased 
graduate education opportunities, guaranteed base housing, geographic stability, 
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leave sabbatical, telecommuting, and additional money for dependents (education 
and daycare).  These incentives were adjusted in the enlisted Sailor survey to reflect 
enlisted Sailor attributes—such as tour length and educational achievement—and 
was modified and expanded to suit the Enlisted Community‘s distinct needs.  
Several previous Navy retention and benefits studies were analyzed; additional 
incentives, such as shipboard berthing options, lump-sum SRB payments, 
transferability of GI Bill benefits, and professional certification programs were also 
added to the enlisted survey. 
1.  Results of Previous Conjoint Analysis 
The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) conducted a Choice-based Conjoint 
survey to determine ―[w]hich [Quality of Service (QOS)] factors are most important to 
the fleet‘s Sailors and how do these QOS factors compare with pay in terms of their 
power to keep people satisfied and in the Navy?‖ (Kraus, Lien & Orme, 2003, p. 11).  
They specifically wanted to determine: 
1. What are Sailors‘ preferences? 
2. What is the strength of those preferences? 
3. What tradeoffs do Sailors make between pay and non-pay factors when 
making reenlistment decisions? 
―In analysis of the [survey] data, the relevant constraint is the Navy budget.  
Specifically, the Navy is looking for information that will help to identify the most 
valued and potentially most cost-effective QOS programs among a variety of 
possibilities‖ (2003, p. 13).  This study did not measure the absolute value of present 
and potential compensation components.  Rather, it measured the relative value of 
these components as compared to the increases in pay required to achieve 
comparable results. Kraus et al. explain:  
The survey results indicate that, even with several measures of pay included 
in the survey, non-pay factors play a substantial, measurable role in guiding 
Sailors‘ reenlistment intentions.  More specifically, the two highest impact 
QOS improvements are location and duty-type assignment guarantees.  
These non-pay factors had pay-equivalent values of 5.7 and 4.3[%], 
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respectively, indicating that Sailors value these guarantees as much as pay 
increases in the range of 4 to 6[%]. (2003, p. 3) 
Other non-monetary incentives that had a significant positive value when 
compared to monetary offerings were guaranteed time for voluntary education and 
increased shipboard living space.  Requiring Sailors to live onboard a ship while in 
port had the largest overall effect—significantly negative.  If this requirement were 
reinstituted, the study found that a 12.5% increase in basic pay would be required to 
maintain current reenlistment rates (2003, p. 62).  The CNA study did not include 
many of the benefits included in this thesis‘s survey, such as leave sabbatical, 
telecommuting, compressed workweek, and transferability of GI Bill benefits. 
2. The “Mix” 
The CNA Research Memorandum Military Compensation Reform in the 
Department of the Navy (Hansen & Koopman, 2005) summarizes the Department of 
the Navy‘s Human Capital Strategy and Guiding Principles as issued by the 
Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Manpower, and Reserve Affairs (ASN (M&RA)). 
The seven strategic ―objectives for creating a well performing, efficient, 
balanced, and effective human capital system […] are to (1) inspire, (2) develop, (3) 
compensate, (4) recruit and access, (5) manage, (6) shape the force, and (7) 
separate or retire […] through [seven] goals‖ (2005, pp. 8-10):  
1. Recruit the proper number of high quality people with the skills required for 
the terms of service needed. 
2. Retain the proper number of high-performing personnel with the right skills 
and experience for the terms of service needed. 
3. Inspire Attainment of the Highest Standards of Performance (Attain High 
Performance), including motivating high levels of individual and collective 
performance, productivity, and contributions needed for the naval Services 
to successfully accomplish their missions. 
4. Reward Exceptional Performance through appropriate means, both 
monetary and nonmonetary. 
5. Assign the best people, with the required skills and experience, to perform 
the needed work, where and when needed. 
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6. Motivate Professional Development (Motivate Development) that fosters a 
culture of professional interest and growth so that people willingly acquire 
and use the skills, knowledge, and abilities required for specific jobs. 
7. Facilitate Career Transitions (Facilitate Transitions) at appropriate times 
between active, reserve, civilian, retired, and volunteer status in response 
to workforce requirements.  The compensation system should allow and 
encourage people to pursue rewarding work/life opportunities throughout 
their careers. (2005, pp. 8-10) 
The Guiding Principles that help decision-makers support these objectives 
are to ensure that programs and policies are: 
1. All Volunteer: The Department‘s compensation policies support an all-
volunteer workforce; members perceive their compensation as ―fair and 
equitable.‖ 
2. Flexible, Responsive (Flexible): The Department must be able to quickly 
and effectively change compensation policies to respond to changing 
market conditions and Service requirements […]. 
3. Strategic Best Value (Best Value): The Department‘s compensation 
policies must be aligned with other elements of their larger human capital 
strategy to produce the highest value, maximizing contribution, and 
minimizing cost […]. 
4. Support Achievement of Strategic Objectives and Outcomes (Support 
Objectives): Rational Compensation Policies support a hierarchy of 
strategic objectives and outcomes for successfully competing for talent 
and rewarding performance and recognizing contribution to mission. 
(2005, p. 10) 
The study evaluates the Navy‘s current major compensation tools and how 
well they follow the four principles and satisfy the seven objectives.  Hansen and 
Koopman (2005) demonstrate that there is not a single compensation tool available 
to the Navy at this time that satisfies all objectives.  Most of the compensation tools 
do not fulfill half of the goals and adhere weakly—if at all—to the guiding principles.  
Figure 9 shows the scorecard for Retirement Pay, which is the worst-performing 
compensation tool.  Figure 10 shows the scorecard for Basic Pay, which is, not 




Figure 9. Retirement Incentive Scorecard (After Military Compensation Reform) 
(Hansen & Koopman, 2005, Appendix C) 
After analyzing the current tools available to the Navy, they suggest a flexible 
(or cafeteria) plan: ―if the employer can provide in-kind benefits in a way that allows 
people to retain some decision-making authority over their consumption choices, the 
value of the in-kind benefits will be higher.  This is the motivation behind cafeteria or 
Flexible benefit plans, which are becoming more prevalent with private-sector 
employers‖ (2005, p. 79). 
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Figure 10. Basic Pay Scorecard (After Military Compensation Reform)  
(Hansen & Koopman, 2005, Appendix C) 
They further suggest that: 
[o]nce an optimal mix of cash and in-kind benefits is determined […], as much 
choice as possible should be offered among different benefits (e.g., cafeteria 
plans).  In this way, the DON‘s benefit package will best align its guiding 
principles of being Flexible and Best Value while Supporting the Objectives 
often met through noncash compensation. (2005, p. 72) 
Their final recommendation includes a quality-based compensation plan, 
which will not be addressed in this research.  The focus of the Combinatorial 
Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) is to achieve cost-effectiveness while 
maintaining current quality.  The current system of evaluations and retention 
recommendations is sufficient to maintain acceptable levels of quality.  Providing a 
compensation system tailored to individual needs and desires will retain those most 
willing to serve.  
Based on the criterion set forth by Hansen and Koopman (2005), the CRAM 
model proposed in this paper could have a scorecard similar to Figure 11.   
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No: Congress can adjust 
levels but cannot vary by 
service or occupation.
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increase in basic pay 
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Figure 11. Projected CRAM Scorecard (After Military Compensation Reform)  
(Hansen & Koopman, 2005, Appendix C) 
The CRAM Model will address the strategic goals of Recruit and Retain by 
showcasing the abundance and variety of benefits available to service members.  It 
will be a highly Flexible and responsive tool that will adjust easily and readily to 
changing labor supply and demand conditions.  It will provide strategic Best Value to 
the Navy by ensuring considerable Sailor value while also being more cost effective 
than the current compensation policies.  
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IV. Surface Warfare Officer and Enlisted Sailor 
Retention Surveys 
To test the hypothesis—offering non-monetary incentives in a total rewards, 
flexible benefits package would be the most efficient method of achieving the Navy‘s 
retention objectives—it was necessary to determine the value Surface Warfare 
Officers and Enlisted Sailors placed on those incentives.  To determine these 
values, surveys were designed and administered to both populations throughout the 
fleet.  To mitigate issues in the enlisted retention survey, such as first-term obligation 
length, training intensity and length, minimum recruiting criterion, civilian 
opportunities, and SRB levels, the Enlisted Retention Survey focused on two Navy 
enlisted ratings rather than on the entire enlisted population. 
A. Surface Warfare Officers 
Surface Warfare is the Navy community that uses surface ships for the 
missions of forward naval presence, sea control and projection of power ashore. The 
Surface Warfare community is the oldest community in the Navy and today 
comprises just over 8,000 officers (Graham, 2006).  Surface Warfare Officers are the 
fleet‘s ―ship drivers‖ that operate surface ships at sea, including managing all the 
onboard systems and personnel.  It is their job to lead the ship into harm‘s way when 
so directed by higher authority.  The pinnacle of a Surface Warfare Officer‘s career 
path would typically be to command a ship at sea.   
Like all other naval officers, the Surface Warfare Officer typically comes into 
the Navy with a four-year college degree. Most of these junior Surface Warfare 
Officers go directly to sea after graduating from their undergraduate institutions, 
serving their first tour division officer job when they arrive.  The SWO division officer 
tours are designed to provide the hands-on training and development necessary for 
the new officers entering the fleet.  Division officer tours are typically 24 and 18 
months for 1st and 2nd division officer tours, respectively. 
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Upon successfully completing their two afloat division officer tours, they have 
the opportunity to rotate to shore duty and pursue a variety of interests, which may 
include pursuing a graduate degree, working in a staff position or working as a 
recruiter.  This time ashore is designed to further broaden the experience of young 
SWOs, as well as provide them additional education and training as they prepare to 
return to the fleet as Department Heads afloat.   
Today, the Navy‘s primary concern with the Surface Warfare Officer 
community is how to continue to retain the necessary quality and quantity of officers 
past their initial obligations to ensure there are sufficient Surface Warfare Officers 
available to fill all the Department Head jobs that exists across the fleet.  Typically, 
junior SWOs reach the end of their initial obligated service period while on their 
second afloat division officer tour or, at the latest, on their first shore tour.  Most of 
these officers must make critical career decisions on whether to stay in the Navy or 
look for a career in the civilian sector.  Many decide to get out of the Navy at this 
point; others may try to make a lateral transfer to another community, while some 
decide to continue in their SWO career path.   
During the past 10 years, the Navy has faced a shortage of Surface Warfare 
Officers at the Department Head Level. To increase the SWO retention rate into their 
Department Head Tours, the Navy implemented the Surface Warfare Officer 
Continuation Pay (SWOCP), a special pay designed to incentivize those personnel 
eligible to pursue their SWO careers as afloat Department Heads.  Upon acceptance 
of the SWOCP, the officers must commit to completing Department Head School, 
followed by two back-to-back 18-month Department Head tours afloat. 
1. SWO Retention Survey 
For the SWO survey, Denmond et al. (2007) first surveyed Surface Warfare 
Officers currently attending the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS).  The survey 
consisted of 18 questions and took approximately 15 minutes to complete.  The 
primary target groups for the survey are those Surface Warfare Officers who have or 
have not completed their initial division officer tours and have not yet signed a 
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contract accepting a retention bonus or submitted a request for resignation from 
active duty.  The survey included basic demographic questions, such as ethnicity, 
commissioning source, number of dependents, and the highest level of education 
completed.  Their research used a web-based survey using Surveymonkey.  Based 
on the geographical dispersion of our sample audience and their corresponding 
relative ease of access to the internet (in most cases), this survey method proved to 
be the most appropriate for our purposes.  Surveymonkey is a licensed survey web 
engine utilized by the Naval Postgraduate School.  The survey was distributed, 
collected, and completed anonymously by the following designated groups: 
Table 1. Web-based Survey Open/Close Dates 




 NPS Students 
 Junior SWOS 
afloat 
 26 JUL 2007 
 13 AUG 2007 
 10 AUG 2007 
 25 AUG 2007 
 
The survey was distributed via e-mail to the Naval Postgraduate School 
Surface Warfare Officers during the summer quarter of academic year 2007.  These 
officers were given two weeks to complete the survey, with reminder e-mails sent at 
the end of the first week and two days prior to the survey deadline.  The survey was 
also distributed to junior SWOs serving on ships throughout the fleet.  In both cases, 
the survey audience was notified of the survey via e-mail.  The students at NPS 
were requested to take the survey by the senior SWO at NPS. 
For the afloat units, e-mails were sent by Professor Gates (then Associate 
Dean for Research in the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy at the 
Naval Postgraduate School), in coordination with the project team, to 110 
Commanding Officers serving on afloat units.  The ships chosen for the survey were 
platforms on which typical junior SWOs serve for their first and second Division 
Officer tours.  Ship types included: Frigates (FFG), Destroyers (DDG), Cruisers 
(CG), Dock Landing Platforms (LPD), and Dock Landing Ships (LSD). They are 
located in a variety of fleet concentration and deployed locations to include Norfolk, 
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San Diego, Yokosuka, Bahrain, Jacksonville, Pearl Harbor and Everett.  
Commanding Officers were asked to distribute the survey description and web link to 
their junior officers; however, they themselves would have no visibility over the 
individual responses of the officers under their command.   It was noted in the 
survey that participants would be allowed to view the results upon the completion of 
the survey research.  The e-mail text is as follows: 
Commodores, Commanding Officers, and Executive Officers, 
As Associate Dean of Research for the Graduate School of Business and Public 
Policy at NPS, I am advising a group of MBA project students looking at the SWO retention 
bonuses.  This comes out of the work that NPS did last year that found the SWO retention 
rates very low, particularly for female officers.  As a result of that work, and the life-work 
balance conference at NPS, we are interested in looking at multi-attribute SWO retention 
bonuses (money plus homeport, etc.).  Our intended audience is all Surface Warfare Officers 
O-3 and below who have not accepted the SWOCP. 
As a first step, the students hoped to survey SWOs to see how they would respond to 
non-monetary bonuses.  I have attached the survey for your information.  The idea is to use 
the survey results in a simulation model to come up with a (very) preliminary estimate of the 
cost-effectiveness of this idea. In the future we are looking at combining this work with the on-
going research we have on bonus auctions.  I can give you more details if you are interested.  
I will be on leave, with limited e-mail access through Aug. 20.  If there are any questions 
regarding this survey, feel free to contact the students copied on this e-mail by replying to all. 
I would greatly appreciate your assistance in getting this survey out to your Junior 
officers. The survey link is listed below: 
http://www.surveymonkey.com/s.aspx?sm=P60phnT96MRwK6qzb6yvGA_3d_3d 
The survey will be closed on August 25th. 
In trying to determine survey response rates, the authors were unable to 
identify the exact number of officers in each of the sample sizes. The response rate 
is the proportion of all participants selected who completed the survey (Keller, 2005).  
The authors were not able to identify how many lateral transfers from the SWO 
community were attending NPS; some may not have received the survey.  In 
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regards to the junior shipboard SWOs, the authors were unable to determine just 
how many officers were onboard each ship that fit the eligibility criteria for survey 
completion (O-3 and below who have not yet signed on for SWOCP), or how many 
actually received the survey.  The authors used the known wardroom size for each 
ship type, assuming 100 percent manning, to estimate the approximate sample size 
and to calculate a response rate.  Table 2 provides estimates response rates. 
Table 2. NPS and Fleet Survey Results Total 










NPS SWO Students 180 53 29 % 
Junior SWOs afloat 1200 260 22 % 
 
According to statistics, specifically the Central Limit Theorem, for any sample 
size with n ≥ 30, where n represents the sample size of the population in question, 
we can accurately use our findings to make predictions about the population (Keller, 
2005).  In this project, we have sample sizes equal to or greater than 30 in both 
instances, with NPS students totaling 53 and SWOs afloat totaling 260; in both 
cases, we are able to make accurate predictions about the population.  While the 
NPS student survey provided a useful cross reference, it will not be analyzed further 
here; the NPS respondents have agreed to be retained as SWOs, so they are not a 
representative sample. 
Of the 260 responses from junior SWOs afloat, 105 stated that there was no 
amount of money that would induce them to retain. They were excluded from this 
analysis.  Officers whose base monetary bids exceeded $200,000 were also 
excluded.  Many bids in this category were seven figures or more, likely indicated an 
unwillingness to retain.  Furthermore, there is a $200,000 Title IX cap on officer 
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bonuses.  After removing these respondents, there were 144 legitimate bids.  These 
respondents were used in this analysis. 
5. Summary of Enlisted Retention Survey Responses 
Table 3 lists the average reservation values for a purely monetary 
reenlistment bonus and the dollar amount of that bonus the respondents would be 
willing to give up in exchange for a particular incentive.  The values in Table 3 
exclude bids in excess of $200,000.   
Table 3. Average Reservation Values for Respondents 
 
All Willingness to Pay (WTP) values for the nonmonetary incentives were less 
than SRB requirements stated by that respondent.  This indicates some consistency 
in reporting.  Combined incentive values were less consistent.  The value of two or 
more incentives in combination sometimes exceeded the sum of the individual 
values.  This indicates complementarities between or among the combined 
incentives.  Often, the value of two or more incentives in combination exceeded the 
highest individual value, but did not equal the sum of the individual incentives.  This 
indicates a possible diminishing marginal value to each additional non-monetary 
incentive or a substitution effect between or among the incentives within the 
combination.  
In approximately 18% of the responses, the reported value of two or more 
incentives in combination was below the value of the most highly valued individual 
incentive in that combination.  While unusual, there are many reasons why such 
reported combination values may have occurred.  There may have been a significant 
negative interaction among the incentives included in the combination.  For example, 
 
SRB Required 105,077 $   
Homeport 10,617 $     
Ship 3,654 $       
Billet 7,210 $       
One Year Sabbatical 11,235 $     
Telecommuting 11,373 $     
Geographic Stability (2 tours) 11,760 $     
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a Sailor might have been interested in ship or billet type separately, but perhaps his 
particular situation made choice of ship and billet type particularly unappealing.  
More simply, perhaps the respondent just forgot how the incentives had been valued 
in previous questions, or the respondent grew tired and rushed through those final 
questions.  Chapter VI discusses how such unusual responses were addressed. 
B. Enlisted Communities 
The Air Traffic Controller (AC) and Fire Controlman AEGIS (FC AEGIS) 
ratings were selected by the research sponsor for the Enlisted Retention Survey 
based on each community‘s size and retention challenges.  The Department of the 
Navy indentified these ratings as two of the twenty ―most undermanned critical skills‖ 
(DoN, 2008).  The Naval Personnel Command provided the following information 
about the AC and FC ratings: 
1. Air Traffic Controller 
Navy Air Traffic Controllers (AC) perform duties similar to civilian air traffic 
controllers and play a key role in the effective use of Naval airpower 
throughout the world in operational and training environments.  Navy ACs are 
responsible for safely and effectively directing aircraft operating from airfields 
or the decks of aircraft carriers.  They also control the movement of aircraft 
and vehicles on airfield taxiways and issue flight instructions to pilots by radio.  
Standards for entry into the AC field are high, but once accepted into the field, 
Navy ACs enjoy a demanding and highly rewarding career.  This is a five-year 
enlistment program. (Otten, 2008, November 18) 
2. Fire Controlman 
Only two Navy job specialties, called "ratings," are included in the Advanced 
Electronics/Computer Field: Electronics Technician (ET) and Fire Controlman 
(FC).  The rating in which an Advanced Electronics/Computer Field candidate 
is trained is determined in the initial phase of the Advanced Electronics 
Technical Core Course in Great Lakes, Ill.  However, eligibility requirements 
are the same for both ratings in the Advanced Electronics/Computer Field. 
Jobs performed by […] FCs are performed throughout the Navy's fleet of 
surface ships including aircraft carriers and Aegis cruisers, and at repair 
activities ashore […].  
FCs operate, maintain and repair the Fire Control Radars, mainframe 
computers, large screen displays, LANS, weapon control consoles, automatic 
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gun systems and associated electro-mechanical systems utilized in weapons 
systems. 
These ratings comprise the basis of the ship's Combat Systems department 
aboard ships and are responsible for maintaining the ship's readiness for 
combat operations. (Salter, 2008, November 6) 
While the AC and FC ratings are vastly different in terms of duties and 
responsibilities, they are comparable with respect to initial obligation length, intensity 
of training, and quantity of civilian employment opportunities.  
3. Population Statistics 
There were 2,306 ACs at the time of the survey, 20.4% of which were female. 
There were 2,115 E-6 and below, and 29.7% of the rating‘s billets were at sea.  Of 
the 2038 FC AEGIS personnel, only 6.4% were female.  There were 1,733 E-6 and 
below, and 76.7% of the rating‘s billets were at sea.  There were 4,032 Non-AEGIS 
FCs in the fleet—of which 8.9% were female, and 62.7% of these billets were at sea 
(Ferber, 2008, July 18).  The AC and FC ratings provide an excellent contrast to 
each other in terms of the above demographic characteristics.  Due to the relatively 
small size and 15% expected response rate, the researchers chose to distribute the 
survey to the entire population (including non-AEGIS FCs). 
Because of the second-hand nature of contacting the Sailors, a response rate 
was difficult to determine.  Dependent on the number of Sailors actually contacted, 
response estimates ranged from 8.6% to 11.5%.  Although the response rate was 
relatively low (Kraus et al., 2003, p. 31), there was a fairly representative sample.  
Table 3 shows a comparison of the population versus the sample in key 
demographics.  Hispanics were considerably over-represented in the FC (AEGIS) 
rating.  Air Traffic Controller was under-represented at sea, and Fire Controlman 
was over-represented.  
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Table 4. Population and Sample Statistics 
 
1. FC(NON-AEGIS) significantly under-represented (Hispanic) 
2. Due to targeting of E-6 and below, under-representation expected 
3. AC under-represented and FC over-represented (at sea) 
 
In the sample, the extremely low percentage of age 42 and above reflects the 
specific targeting of Sailors E-6 and below. 
4. Enlisted Retention Survey 
Unfortunately, Naval Personnel Command (NPC) was only able to provide 
approximately 50% of the e-mail addresses for personnel with those ratings.  
Potential subjects were contacted through the available individual e-mail addresses.  
To ensure maximum contact, approximately 150 Command Master Chiefs were also 
sent e-mails requesting that they forward the survey invitation (below) to their 
respective Petty Officers First Class (E-6) and below ACs and FCs (AEGIS and non-
AEGIS): 
Subj: Survey Invitation from the Naval Postgraduate School 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE: 
You are cordially invited to participate in the Naval Postgraduate School‘s Non-
Monetary Retention Incentives Survey. This survey will allow you to give us important 
feedback regarding non-monetary benefits such as geographic stability, 
telecommuting, compressed workweek or guaranteed homeport as well as an 
opportunity for you to give ―write-in‖ suggestions. The survey‘s main focus is to 
assess how much you would value the included non-monetary benefits if they were 
offered as a part of your reenlistment package.  
  AC FC(non-AEGIS) FC(AEGIS) 
  Population Sample Population Sample Population Sample 
Female 20.81% 21.62% 8.93% 11.76% 7.50% 11.80% 
Black 23.59% 22.27% 10.97% 8.11% 11.45% 12.57% 
Hispanic 15.62% 9.55% 1.36% 5.95% 10.62% 10.18% 
Under 27 59.66% 57.14% 48.45% 58.82% 46.13% 54.80% 
28-42 37.96% 42.38% 47.73% 39.57% 49.83% 42.94% 
Over 42 2.38% 0.48% 4.27% 1.60% 4.34% 2.26% 
E6 & below 92.11% 97.76% 82.49% 96.79% 85.39% 95.51% 
E-5 37.20% 41.70% 34.76% 54.55% 40.43% 51.12% 
E-4 & below 30.35% 19.28% 24.39% 17.11% 14.52% 11.80% 




If you receive this invitation from more than one source, we apologize. We are 
sending these invitations through multiple avenues to ensure everyone gets a voice! 
Please only take the survey once.  Thank you in advance for your participation! 
Survey closes 11 Jul 08. Please click on link: 
http://www.surveymk.com/s.aspx?sm=m3GQ9plp63OmH52DN8N0Bg_3d_3d 
The survey was available via Surveymonkey from June 24, 2008, until July 
11, 2008.  The entire survey is included in Appendix B. 
5. Summary of Enlisted Retention Survey Responses 
There were 688 completed surveys.  Only 604, however, were usable.  The 
deleted observations were missing crucial data (i.e., reservation values).  It was not 
possible to infer this data from the other available information.  Derived numbers 
were contained in 17 observations.2   
Table 5 lists the average reservation values for a purely monetary 
reenlistment bonus and the dollar amount of that bonus the respondents would be 
willing to give up in exchange for a particular incentive.  The values in column 1 
include outliers (initial values in excess of $500,0003) and currently infeasible 
amounts (in excess of $150,0004).  Column 2 excludes outliers and Column 3 
                                            
2 Of these individuals, 15 indicated that they would reenlist for free (no SRB).  They proceeded, 
however, to indicate a willingness to pay (WTP) a percentage of their SRB for the non-monetary 
incentives listed.  We inferred that they were aware of their eligibility for an SRB and were basing 
their WTP percentages on this amount.  SRB amounts, for calculation of WTP only, were derived 
from demographic information provided.  The Navy‘s online SRB calculator 
(https://staynavytools.bol.navy.mil/SRB/Default.aspx) was used. SRB amounts for these individuals 
were entered as zero.  The remaining 2 individuals indicated that they would require the ―current 
SRB‖ to reenlist.  Their SRB amounts were derived using the above link. 
3 Values above $500,000 seemed to indicate that no amount of money would entice the respondent 
to reenlist.  There were only three responses in this category: $500,000, $1,000,000, and 
$10,000,000.  These observations significantly skew the summary statistics and are considered true 
outliers. 
4 Although current maximum SRB amount can not exceed $90,000 (Chief of Naval Operations, 2007), 




excludes infeasible requirements.  All usable responses, except one,5 were included 
in the thesis simulations. 
Table 5. Average Reservation Values for Respondents 
 
With the exception of one value entry, all Willingness to Pay (WTP) values 
were less than the stated SRB requirements.  This again indicates some consistency 
in reporting.  As before, combined incentive values were less consistent.  The value 
of two or more incentives in combination sometimes exceeded the sum of the 
individual values.  At other times, the value of two or more incentives in combination 
exceeded the highest individual value but did not equal the sum of the individual 
incentives.  Finally, in approximately 30% of the responses, the reported value of 
two or more incentives in combination was below the value of the most highly valued 
individual incentive in that combination.  Again, while unusual, there may be a 
significant negative interaction among the incentives included in the combination.  
                                            
5 Respondent 623144606‘s responses were deleted.  The Sailor‘s SRB requirement ($10,000,000) 
and two NMI values ($5,000,000 each) significantly skewed results. 
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Use of the mean to determine central tendencies can be misleading in non-
normal distributions.  In both surveys, many of the value distributions for the non-
monetary incentives have large clusters at zero dollars, smaller clusters at certain 
―focal‖ values, and long right-hand tails with few high values.  This is shown in Figure 
12. 
 
Figure 12. Value Distribution for Telecommuting—Enlisted Survey 
Because of this asymmetric distribution of values, a simple report of means 
and standard deviations does a poor job of describing the distribution of values 
associated with any particular non-monetary incentive. Consequently, Tables 6 and 
7 display the 10th, 25th, 50th, 75th and 90th percentile values for the SWO and 
enlisted surveys, respectively, to more accurately describe the value distribution for 
each incentive.  It is also advantageous to describe the distributions of values this 
way because the simulations, which this research describes later, used different 
percentiles of the value to estimate costs.  Appendix C contains value distribution 




Table 6. Reservation Value Percentiles—SWO Survey 
 
Table 7. Reservation Value Percentiles—Enlisted Survey 
 
One immediate and striking characteristic revealed in Tables 6 and 7 is that 
both the 10th and 25th percentiles of the distribution of reported values for every 
non-monetary incentive is zero.  This means that for each non-monetary incentive, 
at least 25% of all respondents saw no value in that particular incentive.  In 11 of the 
19 NMIs analyzed across both surveys, the median respondents reported a value of 
zero or $1.  In two cases, more than 75% of the respondents reported a zero value 
for the NMI (BAH on sea duty and lump-sum SRB for the enlisted community). 
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th 
SRB Required 50,000 $  75,000 $  100,000 $   150,000 $   150,000 $   
Homeport 0 0 5,000 15,000 25,000 
Ship 0 0 0 5,000 10,000 
Billet 0 0 1,000 10,000 20,000 
One Year Sabbatical 0 0 1 20,000 36,000 
Telecommuting 0 0 1,000 20,000 40,000 




It is also relevant to note that there were 54 reported NMI values that were 
not usable.  This is because it was not possible to infer values based on the 
respondents‘ answers.  For example, ―this would never happen‖ seems to imply that 
the respondent values the option but doesn‘t believe it is feasible.  Some 
respondents put actual choices, such as ―San Diego‖ for the homeport option, but 
failed to indicate a dollar amount they were willing to pay.  Again, this implies some 
value but not a specific amount.  These values were assumed to be zero to include 
the respondent‘s other choices.  There may be, however, some minor bias 
introduced into the model due to these discrepancies. 
Note, however, that any bias introduced by assigning a zero value to these 
answers works in favor of the strictly monetary retention incentives.  Further, it works 
against the two non-monetary incentive options examined in this study (the universal 
incentive package and the combinatorial retention auction mechanism).  Thus, the 
cost savings calculated in this study actually understate the true cost savings that 
could be achieved by effectively incorporating non-monetary incentives into the 
Navy‘s retention offers.  Nonetheless, the ultimate impact of assuming zero value for 
these answers is likely minor, as these 54 values account for less than 0.4% of the 
15,289 reported NMI values.  These 54 responses came from 26 different 
respondents, or 3.5% of the sample. 
2. Reasons for Accepting or Rejecting the SRB 
Respondents in both surveys were asked to provide an open-response 
answer why they might accept or decline and SRB, if offered.  The responses 
ranged from insightful, well-articulated ideas to frustration over policies and 
perceptions.  There were, however, categories of responses that warrant further 
discussion. 
a. SWO Survey 
There were several recurring attitudes that junior SWOs expressed during the 
survey.  These themes can be grouped into the following categories: 
1. Lack of family time, work-life balance issues, excessive work hours 
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2. Poor command climate, micromanagement 
3. Threat of Individual Augmentation (IA) assignment 
4. Overall job dissatisfaction  
Many SWOs felt that command leadership has no regard for their personal 
well-being or morale.  These officers felt that Department Head tour commitments 
would make it difficult to be present for major personal/family milestones such as 
vacations, family reunions, weddings, class reunions, births and funerals.  The 
survey also indicated SWOs were dissatisfied with the command culture and felt that 
their assigned tasks were repetitive and offered no chance for individual initiative.  
They also expressed concern about IA deployments.  Aviation and staff corps 
community cultures are more appealing to junior SWOs because of the high stress 
in the Surface Warfare Officer Community.  Overall, junior SWOs felt that they have 
to work excessive hours, fill stressful sea duty billets and must have a senior mentor 
who can assist them with the detailing process in order to be successful. 
b. Reasons for Accepting the SRB—Enlisted Survey 
Figure 13 summarizes the distribution of the most common reasons for the 




Figure 13. Reasons for Accepting the SRB 
“The Money” 
Almost half (47%) of those who answered indicated that ―money,‖ or the size 
of the bonus, was their primary reason for accepting the SRB.  The tone, however, 
of these responses suggests that there may have been other factors that influenced 
this decision, but the question wording was unclear.  For example, respondent 
623952540 states, ―I don't know why I wouldn't accept it. It's one of the reasons I 
would be reenlisting.‖  Many also included a non-monetary reason, such as 
respondent 622991201, who noted, ―It was for 75,000 and I enjoy what I do,‖ or 
respondent 621771622 who wrote, ‖The amount of money, but would also like 
geographic location.‖ 
Other Cash-related Reasons 
Almost 33% of the responses fell into the following categories: to pay a 
specific/debt or bills (9.9%); to save for the future/retirement (12.8%); to compensate 
for equivalent civilian pay (3.2%); to compensate for type of work performed (2.8%); 
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and specific family needs (4.1%).  While these reasons indicate the expected use of 
the bonus, many could feasibly be satisfied with non-monetary compensation. 
For example, respondent 621185813 states, ―[P]ay off bills quickly and 
maintaining health insurance and life insurance from the government.‖  This 
indicates that the respondent intended to use the SRB to pay off bills in a timely 
manner, but may have reenlisted for the medical and life insurance benefits. 
“I love the Navy” 
Just over 6% said they were planning to reenlist anyway and that the bonus 
was an added benefit.  This indicates significant economic rent or surplus is being 
paid to these individuals, as 57% of them are FCs who currently receive substantial 
SRBs.  For example, respondent 622007241 ―[W]as going to stay in anyway. Bonus 
was an extra incentive.‖  Some did, however, indicate they believed the SRB kept 
them on par with their civilian counterparts.  Respondent 623273057 stated, ―I 
already love my job and this is incentive for me not to go to the civilian sector and 
make more money.‖   
Other Reasons 
Almost 13% of respondents indicated that their reasons for reenlisting were 
non-monetary.  These covered a wide variety of reasons, including medical, dental 
and retirement benefits, job stability, liking the Navy, enjoying one‘s job, duty 
location guarantee, shore duty, advancement opportunities, pride in service. One 
individual indicated he was reenlisting for the opportunity to go to sea! 
c. Reasons for Declining the SRB—Enlisted Community 
Figure 14 summarizes the distribution of the most common reasons for the 




Figure 14. Reasons for Declining the SRB 
Civilian Opportunities 
The most popular reason for declining the bonus was better opportunities or 
pay in the civilian sector.  Of those who answered this way, 59% were FCs.  This 
suggests that there is still a perceived pay-gap beyond that which the SRB attempts 
to compensate. 
“The Money” 
Only 21% of those who answered the question indicated that they would not 
accept the SRB because the amount was too low.  Combining this group with those 
who referenced better civilian opportunities or pay, as described in ―Civilian 
Opportunities,‖ leaves 57% whose reported reasons for not reenlisting were not 
directly pecuniary.  Therefore, these might be addressed via non-monetary 
incentives. 
 “I don’t like this place” 
Just over 18% of respondents indicated they were unhappy with aspects of 
their jobs or Navy life.  Respondent 621725008 states, ―I do not enjoy military life.  
Most of my time is not actually spent working with electronics.  I am a highly trained 
 61 
 
individual who spends most of his time cleaning instead of troubleshooting the 
weapon system.‖  This same individual indicated that he would accept the SRB 
because it ―was a good amount of money, the Navy has been good for me and my 
family.‖  These responses indicate that, for this individual, money is not the primary 
driver for retention. 
“I’m getting out” 
Almost 14% of respondents gave no specific reason, but indicated that they 
would not be reenlisting.  It is unclear from the results if some of these individuals 
were unwilling or unable to reenlist because they simply answered ―I will not be 
reenlisting‖ or words to that effect.  Of those who meant they were unwilling due to 
some non-pecuniary compensation issues, perhaps these individuals could be 
retained through non-monetary incentives. 
“What ifs” 
Only 7% of respondents gave hypothetical situations in which they would not 
reenlist.  For example, respondent 622066295 stated, ―If at the time of re-enlistment, 
it is not worth staying in, in regards to family and personal time.‖  Respondent 
622046321 stated, ―If I am selected for an enlisted to officer program.‖  Others 
indicated if the amount was not enough, they would not reenlist, but did not specify 
that the current amount was too low. For example, ―If I can't choose my orders and 
the sum is lower than I expected‖ (respondent 623904752). 
OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO 
Dissatisfaction with sea/shore rotation, deployment schedules, and time away 
from family were primary reasons for 14% of respondents to decline the SRB.  
Almost 8% specifically stated time away from family as the primary reason.  While 
high operations tempo (OPTEMPO) and subsequent family separation are 
necessities in the Navy, there may be an opportunity to retain these Sailors if they 
believe they are not excessive.  Respondent 623140885‘s statement reflects a 
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common sentiment, ―Due to cutbacks, ships are undermanned and that means even 
longer hours in port and less time with family.‖ 
3. Respondent Retention Suggestions 
Enlisted respondents were also asked to list any other non-monetary 
incentive(s) that the Navy could offer which would be attractive and the amount of 
bonus dollars they would be willing to give up to receive that incentive. 
Figure 15 summarizes the most common responses from the enlisted 
community. 
 
Figure 15. Open Comments 
Over half of the responses fit into one of six basic categories.  The remaining 
44% proposed changes to the promotion system, structuring of billets, retirement 
policy, education opportunities, and current leadership.  For example, respondent 
621267862 stated:  
Return the training commands to the military, who possess a clue 
about what is necessary to train Sailors rather than civilians who have 
no concept of shipboard life.  Working knowledge of the gear is far 
more valuable than theory and experience on an actual platform 
surpasses a civilian‘s dry-side knowledge.  Open the billets for training 
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back up for the Sailors who know the gear and how it really acts. 
$45,000 (all). 
Respondent 621303137 stated, ―Retire at 10 years service—$60,000. 
Automatic advancement—$40,000.‖  Respondent 621318214 suggested, ―TAD 
orders set aside for college and/or work toward college (9 mo/s - 1 year)—$45000.‖  
This is an interesting twist to the sabbatical idea and is similar to the former Enlisted 
Education Advancement Program.  Respondent 621566154 gave multiple 
suggestions and feedback on our survey options and also expressed frustration with 
the current SRB policy: 
I believe you need to seriously modify the current plan installed now for 
SRB. There are Sailors at my command that have been in for 4 years, 
do not have their Enlisted Surface Warfare Specialist Pin, do not have 
collateral duties, and are getting ready to reenlist for $75,000 (tax free). 
Where is the logic in that? You are rewarding those who do nothing for 
you. I believe there should be a series of requirements to be able to 
receive amounts like this. As for your compressed work week, there is 
not enough time in the week now to get what we need done (I am a 
CIWS Tech) so I do not speak for all rates.  Some of us do this [10-hr 
days] already 5/6 days a week and love our jobs. What kills our 
motivation is when the Navy gives and gives and gives to those who 
produce nothing.  I am not a disgruntled Sailor and I plan on retiring.  I 
did get $45,000 a few years ago when I reenlisted, but I worked 
extremely hard for it.  I do enjoy my job and appreciate what the Navy 
had offered me.  Unfortunately, I am seeing way too many first class 
and chief petty officers getting out with 10,14,16 years of service.  And 
the reason is because the ‗Navy is changing.‘  I do agree heavily on 
billet choice, geographic stability, and transferring of the GI Bill.  These 
are the things we need to really consider.  Making a Sailor and his 
family happy are key to morale at commands. 
OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO 
Deployment schedule, sea/shore rotation, and time away from family 
continued to be of primary concern to these participants.  14% of those who 
answered gave a suggestion to improve these areas.  Respondent 621751867 
stated: 
The main reason why I will not reenlist is due to the under-manning 
and increased demand while at sea.  I have to do almost twice the 
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amount of work with almost half the manning from when I was on my 
first ship.  I am not impressed or convinced the new ―business model‖ 
for the Navy is effective.  This is the military not a Fortune 500 
company.  I have little time to pursue personal goals while on active 
sea duty where FC's have to be.  The new ship's schedules are non-
stop.  It is possible to take PACE and distance learning classes, but 
time and internet constraints make it difficult.  If our sea/shore rotation 
could be altered to allow FC's more time on shore to allow degree 
pursuits, professional certifications and spend more time with family.  
More quality training facilities need to be utilized for our new Sailors.  
Computer-based learning is not as effective as having a seasoned 
technician teach.  The possibility to do back-to-back shore would also 
be a good incentive.  Give people time to finish up a degree, raise a 
child, or simply take a break from the rigors of sea duty.  
Extra Leave 
Just over 13% of the respondents indicated they would like to purchase 
additional leave or liberty days in lieu of part of their SRB.  Many gave dollar 
amounts that ranged from $250 per day to $10,000 for an increase to sixty days per 
year.  These responses highlight another potential non-monetary incentive that is not 
currently being considered and has the potential to be a very cost-effective option.6  
Modifications to Survey Items 
Just under 12% of respondents offered suggestions that were similar to our 
survey items, but with modifications.  For example, some indicated they would be 
willing to forgo some of their SRB for 6 months to a year to finish their degree, but on 
active duty versus on a sabbatical.  Respondent 621309181 stated:  
Guaranteed education benefits for reenlisting, i.e., reenlist, and the 
Navy will give the s/m the option of 12 months of paid college benefits 
at the end of the tour (to count as shore duty) s/m could work a shift 
schedule at recruiting station or other duty station or evening/weekend 
schedule—with no cap on the amount of hours to be taken within 12 
month cycle; this could be very attractive to individuals who would like 
a fleet sabbatical to improve their education—just a thought—bonus 
                                            
6 Per-day salary is $180/day for a Sailor making $45,000 per year. This assumes 5 days per week, 50 
weeks per year. 
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reduction of $7,500; designating parking would be an improvement— 
$1000; compressed work schedule—$1,000.‖ 
Purpose of SRB 
A small, but significant, number of respondents seemed to misunderstand the 
purpose of the SRB.  Perhaps, because it is called a ―bonus,‖ the perception is that it 
is some kind of reward for service.  For example, respondent 622473320 stated, 
―[The] SRB for re-enlisting should be higher for those that have committed to doing a 
career in the Navy.‖  The reality is the exact opposite: the SRB should be lower—not 
higher—for those who have committed to a Navy career.  This is because these are 
the types of Sailors who do not need to be paid much of a bonus to induce 
reenlistment.  Instead, higher bonuses should be paid (must be paid) to those 
Sailors most reluctant to commit to a career in the Navy. 
Respondent 623843938 stated, ―I realize there is rank in the military, but I 
often find it disheartening and laughable that I receive the same paycheck as a 
second class BM who scrapes paint all day.‖  This individual is not factoring his 
SRB, that the Boatswains Mate (BM) does not receive, which significantly increases 
his wage above other Sailors of the same rank.  Career counselors and leading 
Chiefs should continue counseling Sailors on their entire compensation package to 
ensure they truly understand the benefits they are receiving. 
Increased Shore Duty Options 
Over 5% indicated they would like to have better shore duty options.  Almost 
70% of those were FCs.  The biggest complaint was that FCs are limited to Recruit 
Training Command, recruiting duty, or instructor billets in Dahlgren, Virginia. 
Individual Augmentation (IA) 
Although only 4% of the open responses mentioned IAs, it was also stated in 
2% of the responses as the primary reason for declining the SRB and, thus, 
deserves discussion.  Respondent 621567958 stated:  
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Shrink deployment times and get rid of IA requirements.  We choose to join 
the Navy for many reasons, some of us love going to sea, patriotism, college 
money.  However, I assure you, especially for those that have been in for 
more then 5 years, no one wanted and few a[re] willing to accept the 
challenge of a 6-18 month IA. 
C. Summary 
Although monetary compensation continues to be a significant motivator of 
retention, non-monetary aspects of military life are clearly important to these SWOs 
and Enlisted Sailors.  The survey produced evidence of dissatisfaction with current 
benefits distribution and offerings and potential retention benefits from the proposed 
non-monetary incentives offered in this research. 
Although many of the value distributions for the non-monetary incentives have 
a large cluster at zero dollars, there are smaller clusters at certain substantial ―focal‖ 
values.  The tails include a few high values (some as high as $50,000 or more).  
These distributions underscore the challenges of applying a ―one-size-fits-all‖ 
compensation package in terms of Sailor satisfaction and cost-effectiveness; they 
also provide evidence to support tailored retention packages designed to maximize 
the benefit to each individual Sailor while minimizing the cost to the Navy.  
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V. Retention Mechanism Alternatives 
A. Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter II, the current system of determining bonus levels is 
sub-optimal.  Strength planners do not currently possess a tool that allows them to 
pinpoint the exact market-clearing bonus level.  The result is either retention deficits 
or surpluses. 
Moreover, despite budgeting more than $350 million per year on retention 
incentives for enlisted personnel and a range of incentives for SWOs, including 
$50,000 per officer for retaining through two Department Head tours, the Navy has, 
in recent years, failed to meet a number of its enlisted and SWO retention goals.  
Thus, it is also important to evaluate whether an alternative retention mechanism, 
beyond the strictly monetary incentives currently employed, might more cost-
effectively achieve the Navy‘s retention objectives.  
This chapter introduces several alternative mechanisms for (1) identifying 
precisely which personnel should receive a retention or re-enlistment bonus and (2) 
determining the appropriate magnitude and composition of such a bonus.  These 
mechanisms include alternatives that employ strictly monetary incentives, as well as 
alternatives which incorporate non-monetary incentives into the retention bonus. 
The next section describes mechanisms which utilize monetary incentives 
alone—either employing a pre-determined cash bonus amount or a cash bonus 
amount determined via auction.  The final two alternatives involve non-monetary 
incentives incorporated into a Total Rewards package.  For example, the Universal 
Incentive Package (UIP) combines a common monetary incentive with a common 
set of non-monetary incentives.  Each is offered to all who are selected for retention 
or reenlistment.  The concluding alternative is the Combinatorial Retention Auction 
Mechanism (CRAM).  This combines individualized monetary incentives with 




B. Monetary Retention Incentives Alone 
The most straightforward approach to retention bonuses is to only use 
monetary incentives.  Determining the appropriate magnitude of this monetary 
incentive, however, can be problematic.  Generally speaking, the amount of the cash 
incentive can either be predetermined using various estimation techniques, or it can 
be determined endogenously via auction or some other market mechanism. 
1. Predetermined Incentive Amount 
As discussed in Chapter II, the size or amounts of the Selected Reenlistment 
Bonuses are predetermined using historical data combined with present economic 
conditions, such as unemployment rate and civilian-military pay gap.  Unfortunately, 
as shown in Figure 16, this model is not a perfect predictor and can result in under-
manning (or under-payment) in some ratings and over-manning (or over-payment) in 
others. 
 
Figure 16. Disadvantages of a Predetermined SRB Level 
2. Determined via Auction 
A properly designed retention auction would inject accuracy into the SRB 
level setting process.  Coughlan, Gates and Zimmerman (2008) argue that retention 
auctions offer the promise of being: 
1. Precise: 
a. Retain the precise number of service members desired. 
b. Identify which individual service members to retain. 
 
Optimal SRB










2. Cost Effective: 
a. Endogenously determine minimum bonus necessary to achieve goals 
[…]. 
3. Voluntary: 
a. Pay each retained service member no less than amount requested in 
bid for retention. 
b. Exclude only those service members who requested more than (or at 
least as much as) amount paid to any retained service member. 
4. Efficient: 
a. Retain service members most willing to continue service. (Coughlan et 
al., 2008) 
A key question, however, is which type of auction would best suit the Navy?  
a. Open- vs. Sealed-bid Format  
By necessity, a Navy retention auction would be a reverse, multiple-winner 
auction.  The single buyer would be the Navy, and the sellers (of their labor) would 
be the Sailors.  NPC (the auctioneer) would pre-determine the number of winners 
within each rating (or NEC) based on end-strength/manning requirements and 
budget constraints. 
The simplest and most understandable variation would be the first-price, 
open-bid auction.  It is, however, not feasible to simultaneously assemble all eligible 
Sailors (even virtually) to accomplish a real-time auction.  The alternative is a 
sealed-bid auction.  Therefore, a choice must be made between first- and second-
price determination. 
b. First-price vs. Second-price  
To compare the first-price vs. second-price auction formats in the retention 
context, we must understand the bidding strategies under each format. 
The optimal bidding strategy for a first price SRB auction is to inflate one‘s bid 
above the true reservation value, or minimum willingness to accept (WTA), to 
maximize economic rent received.  Sailors must balance this strategy with the 
increased likelihood of ―losing‖ the auction by overbidding. 
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In particular, the optimal bidding strategy for a risk-neutral bidder in a first-
price reverse auction is to bid his estimate of the lowest WTA amount among the 
losing bidders.  More precisely, if k Sailors will be retained within a particular rating, 
the equilibrium bidding strategy is for each Sailor to bid what he expects to be the 
k+1st lowest WTA amount (conditional on the assumption that the bidder‘s WTA 
amount is among the lowest k WTA amounts). 
In other words, the Sailors can expect that no Sailor will bid below his WTA 
amount.  Thus, a Sailor is guaranteed to be one of the k ―winners‖ in the auction so 
long as he bids below the k+1st lowest WTA amount among the Sailors bidding.  
Thus, each Sailor is trying to bid as high as he can (above his true WTA amount) 
and still be a winner. 
It is not clear, however, that Sailors will possess the requisite information on 
other Sailor WTA amounts to estimate the k+1st lowest WTA amount.  In the best 
case, bids will simply be inflated somewhat arbitrarily.  In the worst case, the ―wrong‖ 
Sailors (those less willing) will be retained.  To retain them in subsequent auctions 
will likely result in higher retention costs. 
For a second-price, single-winner auction, Chapter II demonstrated that 
truthful revelation is the only rational strategy.  The same holds true—using a similar 
logic that will not be spelled out here—for second-price multiple-winner auctions. 
The problem with this type of auction is convincing less savvy participants that it is in 
their best interest to bid truthfully.  Mandatory training and practice auctions would 
be necessary to ensure personnel understand their optimal strategy. 
c. Cost Equivalence of Auction Types 
With the bidding strategies under both the first-price and second-price 
retention auction articulated, it is important to note that the monetary cost of each 
type of auction is virtually equivalent.  In all Enlisted Retention Auction formats, the 
Sailors who cost the Navy the least, or have the lowest willingness to accept (WTA), 
will be retained.  If one assumes Sailors will not bid less than the minimum amount 
they would be willing-to-accept for retention, the only concern is with the possibility 
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of over-bidding to maximize economic rent.  In Figure 17, the red line represents the 
optimal first-price auction bids, and the blue line represents second-price auction 
bids (in essence, these are the Sailors‘ true reservation values).  
 
Figure 17. Cost-equivalence of First- and Second-price Auctions  
(After Coughlan et al., 2008) 
In the first price auction, the trade-off between risk of non-retention and the 
reward of economic rent determines the optimal strategy.  A risk-neutral Sailor will 
bid what he assumes to be the lowest WTA amount among the losing bidders 
(conditional on his own WTA amount being among the winning WTA amounts).  This 
results in an efficient mechanism: the Sailors who are most willing to remain on 
active duty are retained.  Significant economic rent, however, is paid to those 
individuals who would have stayed for less.  This is the distance between the red 
and blue line for each Sailor.  Additionally, Sailors may have difficulty determining 
the proper bid.  This may reduce the likelihood of retaining those most willing to 
remain in the service (Coughlan et al., 2008). 
In the second-price auction example in Figure 17, the 75 cheapest Sailors are 
retained for the price of the 76th Sailor‘s WTA—in this example, $45,100, for a total 
cost of $3,382,500.  The green triangle represents the Navy‘s reduction in bonus 
payments (to the highest WTA Sailors retained) over the first-price auction.  The red 
triangle shows the Navy‘s increase in bonus payments (to the lowest WTA Sailors 
retained) over the first-price auction.  These two numbers cancel each other, and the 
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result is the equivalent cost to the Navy under both mechanisms.  What is not clearly 
equivalent is Sailor value.  This model assumes that Sailors will accurately predict 
their optimum bid and place it accordingly.  Sailors who would be retained under 
their true reservation values might incorrectly estimate their place in the distribution.  
Thus, they may overbid in the first-price auction and not be retained. 
3. Second-price Retention Auction Example 
Suppose the Navy wishes to retain two out of three Sailors who bid their true 
reservation values of $80,000, $90,000, and $100,000, respectively.  Under the 
second price auction mechanism, Sailors 1 and 2 would be retained for $100,000 
each for a total cost of $200,000.  Sailor 1 would receive a surplus of $20,000, and 
Sailor 2‘s surplus would be $10,000.  This example will be further developed in 
Section D.3 to include the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism.  
C. Universal Incentive Package (UIP) 
1. Description and Purpose  
The simplest way to incorporate non-monetary incentives (NMI) is to offer a 
―one-size-fits-all‖ package that combines a predetermined portfolio of NMIs coupled 
with a cash bonus.  To reach retention goals more efficiently than with money alone, 
the cash payments must be reduced sufficiently to cover the cost of providing the 
NMIs.  If the Sailors value these NMIs more than the Navy‘s cost to provide them, 
the total value delivered to Sailors exceeds the cost of delivery. 
The participants would be offered a fixed package of incentives and would 
submit a cash (requirement) bid to supplement that package.  The auction would 
then follow the same process as the monetary-only auction. 
2. Determining which Incentives to Include  
The main difficulty when designing a Universal Package is determining which 
incentives to include.  There will be a surplus to the Navy for NMIs where Sailor 
value exceeds cost and a deficit associated with NMIs where Sailor value is less 




Figure 18. Cost vs. Value of Non-monetary Incentives  
(After Coughlan et al., 2008) 
Since all who desire the incentive will receive it, there is potential for 
significant deficit to the Navy in offering incentives whose cost exceeds the majority 
of Sailor values.  In Figure 19, if the demand curves shown represent valuations 
among retained Sailors, it would be cost effective to offer choices a and b.  This is 
because total Sailor value exceeds cost.  Choices c and d, however, would result in 
a deficit.  This is because total Sailor value is less than total cost. 
 
Figure 19. Non-monetary Incentives Portfolio 
(After Coughlan et al., 2008) 




Providing an NMI as part of a retention bonus package reduces each Sailor‘s 
minimum cash retention bonus required by the value of that particular NMI to that 
particular Sailor.  Including a particular NMI as part of the Universal Incentive 
Package will reduce total Navy retention costs only if the total surplus among 
retained Sailors (value – cost summed over all retained Sailors with value > cost) 
exceeds the total deficit (cost – value summed over all retained Sailors with value < 
cost) for that NMI.  More directly, the optimal Universal Incentive Package for the 
Navy would only offer those incentives for which the surplus exceeds the deficit 
(among retained Sailors).  
b. Problem: Truthful Revelation 
At the time retention decisions (and potential auction bids) are made, the 
incentive package must already be determined.  Thus, to construct the optimal 
Universal Incentive Package, planners must discover the value distribution of 
prospective incentives among prospective retained Sailors prior to the retention 
decision point.  Sailors, unfortunately, would not have an incentive to truthfully reveal 
their NMI values prior to the retention decision point if they knew the NMI package 
information they provided would determine the package of NMIs that all Sailors 
would receive for free. 
4. Including NMI Based on Sailor Feedback 
a. Value More or Less than Cost 
A possible approach to the problem of identifying appropriate incentives to 
include in the UIP would be to publish the cost of the incentives and ask Sailors if 
they value said incentive as much or more than that cost.  The problem with this 
approach is that respondents may inflate their values to ensure that an incentive will 
be offered. 
b. Relevant Population 
Furthermore, only the valuations among retained Sailors are appropriate for 
determining what incentives should be included in the universal package.  The set of 
retained Sailors is the population that will determine if the NMI total value exceeds 
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its total cost.  Sailors not retained may have high values for some NMIs, but their 
values will not be realized if they are not retained. Therefore, it would be difficult to 
know which Sailors to include in any poll of NMI values. 
c. Determining Usage Rate 
The question still remains: At what level of Sailor value should NMIs be 
included in the package?  As discussed, this answer depends on the value 
distribution of the retained Sailors, as well as how many retained Sailors actually use 
the incentives.  More extensive surveys are required to draw conclusions about the 
value distributions of Navy Sailors.  All of the value distributions from the both the 
SWO and Enlisted Retention Surveys, however, were heavily concentrated to the 
left (low values)—with a large cluster of values at zero, but with a long tail to the right 
(high values).  The enlisted Sailor sabbatical example in Figure 20 has 59% of its 
values at zero, a skewness of 2.79, but a maximum value of $65,000.  The median 
value is zero dollars, and the mean is $4,706. 
 
Figure 20. Value Distribution for One-year Sabbatical 
For this sample, if it costs $4,370 to provide a one-year sabbatical to an 
enlisted Sailor, only 27.2% of the Sailors value the incentive more than its cost.  If 
the Navy retained 100% of the enlisted Sailors surveyed and if all received and used 
the Sabbatical NMI, the total NMI value (VNMI) would approximately equal the total 
NMI cost (CNMI). This is essentially the break-even point because the NMI cost 
equals the mean value.  For the sake of illustration, we assume all Sailors are 
Mean         
4,706 
Mode (59%)              
0 
25th Percentile               
0 
Median                
0 
75th Percentile        
5,000 
90th Percentile       
15,000 
95th Percentile       
25,000 





retained and use the NMI.  In contrast, if the NMI cost is just $70 less ($4,300), VNMI 
- CNMI would show a gain of $42,185.  This is true even though the same percentage 
of individuals values it more than it costs.  If the cost is $70 more ($4,440), the total 
VNMI - CNMI would be a negative $42,234.   
The 75th percentile value for this value distribution is $5,000.  If Sabbaticals 
cost the Navy $5000 with this sample, the Navy would save $1,615,085 in retention 
costs if it offered this NMI and reduced the monetary SRB for all retained Sailors by 
their stated willingness to pay for this NMI.  This assumes only Sailors who placed a 
positive value on Sabbaticals actually used it.  This is probably not realistic: Sailors 
may not be willing to forgo some of their bonus to receive a benefit, but they may 
use it if it is offered for free.  For example, a single Sailor may not place a value on 
his commissary benefits, but he may occasionally use the facility.  Alternatively, the 
Navy would lose $379,914 by offering the one-year Sabbatical option under the 
$5,000 cost scenario if all 603 enlisted Sailors in the sample used it.  This clearly 
illustrates how crucial offerings determination is with the Universal package. 
5. Potential Benefits and Limitations  
For the Universal Incentive Package to be cost-effective, it should include 
only those incentives for which the total Sailor Value exceeds the total cost to 
provide.  In the optimally designed UIP, NMIs a and b in Figure 21 would be 
included; NMIs c and d would not.  This package design has the potential to save 
the Navy money.  This assumes that Sailor values and likelihood of use can be 
accurately predicted.  Unfortunately, discovering these values and probabilities can 
be problematic, and the results could be disastrous.  The above example showed 
the net result of offering enlisted Sabbaticals ranges from a savings of $1.6 million to 
a cost of approximately $379,000; cost effectiveness depends on which Sailors 
actually use the benefit.  Finally, the UIP is not Pareto optimal, i.e., there is still room 
to make some Sailors better off without hurting other Sailors.  The potential Sailor 





Figure 21. Limitations of a Universal Incentive Package  
(After Coughlan et al., 2008) 
D. Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM) 
1. Overview  
The CRAM incorporates three elements that each serve a separate purpose: 
1. Second-price Auction provides accuracy in setting bonus level; 
2. A non-monetary incentive reduces the Navy‘s cost to retain a Sailor when 
that Sailor‘s value > cost for that NMI; 
3. Combinatorial auctions provide individualized incentive packages with no 
"wasted" incentives. 
Under the CRAM, a retained Sailor receives a particular NMI only if he 
expresses a willingness to pay for the incentive that exceeds the Navy‘s cost to 
provide the incentive.  This eliminates the need to determine which incentives to 
offer; all incentives are offered to all Sailors and are allocated to those whose value 
exceeds cost.  For those non-monetary incentives whose cost varies significantly 
depending on the number of participants, there are a number of variations of the 
CRAM which can be adopted to accommodate varying (presumably increasing) unit 
costs.  This includes using equilibrium prices (for which the supply or marginal cost 
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curve intersects the demand or value curve), average costs or quantity limits 
(quotas) for each NMI (these options will not be discussed in detail here). 
2. Process Description 
The CRAM Auction is very similar to the auctions used for monetary retention 
and the Universal Incentive Package described above.  Each Sailor bids the 
minimum SRB he would require if the retention incentive was cash-only.  Each Sailor 
also indicates how much his cash bonus could be reduced for each non-monetary 
incentive, if that non-monetary incentive were included in his retention package. 
After receiving these bids, the auctioneer calculates the minimum cost 
package required to retain each Sailor.  Each minimum cost package includes any 
NMI for which the Sailor‘s value exceeds the Navy‘s cost.  To calculate the Sailor‘s 
provisional cash bonus, the Sailor‘s required cash-only bonus is reduced by the NMI 
value stated in the initial bid for any NMI offered that Sailor.  The Navy‘s total cost of 
those incentives is then added to the provisional cash bonus to derive the Sailor‘s 
―effective‖ cost to the Navy—or the Navy‘s total cost of the package bid. 
After calculating each Sailor‘s minimum cost-retention package, lowest-cost 
Sailors are retained.  Each retained Sailor receives his/her individualized NMI 
package plus a cash bonus that equals the Navy‘s effective cost for the first 
excluded bid minus the Navy‘s cost of his incentive package.  Note that the Navy‘s 
total retention cost is the same for every retained Sailor.  Each Sailor receives a 
personalized NMI package and values the incentives differently, so the value of the 
retention incentive varies across Sailors.  The value each Sailor receives from 
his/her retention package equals or exceeds the Navy‘s retention cost; in many 
cases, a Sailor‘s value significantly exceeds the Navy‘s cost (Coughlan et al., 2008).  
Furthermore, the value for each retained Sailor‘s retention package exceeds his/her 
cash-only bonus requirement. 
3. Process Example 
The graph in Figure 22 continues the example from section B.3 above.  In this 
example, three Sailors truthfully bid their minimum required cash-only SRB (given 
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that this is a generalized, second-price auction), and each states the dollar amount 
of that bonus he would sacrifice for each of the two available NMIs; each NMI is 
assumed to cost the Navy $20,000 per Sailor.  Each Sailor‘s minimum-cost bid 
package includes any NMI for which his value exceeds cost.  Given the values 
shown in Figure 22, Sailor 1‘s bid package would include incentive 1; Sailor 2‘s bid 
package would include incentive 2; and Sailor 3‘s bid package would include both 
incentives.  The auctioneer then calculates a revised minimum cash retention bonus.  
This is the original cash bonus bid minus the sum of the stated values for each NMI 
included in the bid package.  Each Sailor‘s minimum cost to retain is then this 
revised minimum cash bonus plus the total cost of any NMIs included in the bid 
package. 
 
Figure 22. Enlisted Retention Example: CRAM   
(After Coughlan et al., 2008) 
As shown, if the Navy plans to retain two of these three Sailors, Sailors 1 and 
3 would be retained, as they have the two lowest retention costs.  Each of the 
retained Sailors would receive the NMIs included in their bid package; each also 
would receive a cash bonus equal to the total ―effective‖ cost of the first excluded bid 
($80,000 in the example) minus the Navy‘s total cost of the NMIs included in that 
package. 
4. The Advantage of CRAM 
The example in Figure 22 illustrates the money-saving potential of the CRAM 
Auction.  Under a second-price retention auction with monetary incentives alone, 
Sailors 1 and 2 would be retained for a cash bonus equal to the first excluded cash 
bid; the $100,000 bid submitted by Sailor 3.  Thus, the total cost to retain two Sailors 
under a cash bonus is $200,000.  Under the CRAM, Sailors 1 and 3 would each be 
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retained at a cost equal to the total cost of the first excluded package bid.  This cost 
is the Navy‘s $80,000 effective cost associated with Sailor 2‘s minimum cost 
package bid.  Thus, the total cost to retain two Sailors under CRAM is $160,000. 
Compared to the purely cash retention auction, CRAM retains the same 
number of Sailors but reduces the total cost to the Navy.  In addition, CRAM 
potentially increases the Sailors‘ surplus.  The mechanism substitutes cash SRB 
payments with individualized NMI packages when individuals state a willingness to 
pay that is no less than the Navy‘s cost, but the Sailors‘ cash bonus is only reduced 
by the Navy‘s NMI cost.  As a result, each Sailor‘s surplus equals or exceeds their 
surplus under the cash only auction, but at a lower cost to the Navy: a true win-win 
situation. 
Compared to the Universal Incentive Package, CRAM increases efficiency by 
enabling the Navy to capture the surplus represented by the green triangles in 
Figure 23, and by eliminating the Navy‘s potential waste associated with the red 
triangles under the UIP.  CRAM further increases efficiency by capturing the surplus 
from incentives not offered under the UIP, as represented by the blue triangles in 
Figure 23. 
 
Figure 23. CRAM Overcomes the Universal Package Weakness  
(After Coughlan et al., 2008) 
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Further, CRAM eliminates the difficulties involved in identifying the optimal 
universal incentive package: truthful revelation of the NMI values, identifying the 
relevant (retained) population of Sailors, and predicting the actual NMI usage rate.  
Finally, CRAM potentially changes the ―mix‖ of Sailors retained.  In the example 
above, Sailors 1 and 2 were retained under a strictly monetary retention auction; 
Sailors 1 and 3 were retained under CRAM.  The potential impact of CRAM on 
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VI. Simulation Design and Results 
A. Design 
1. General 
Simulations of the various retention mechanism alternatives were conducted 
using the data from the SWO and Enlisted Retention Survey.  In particular, three 
separate generalized, reverse, second-price auction mechanisms were simulated: 
Monetary, UIP, and CRAM. 
The UIP and CRAM simulations require estimating the marginal (or average) 
cost of each NMI.  In the absence of specific cost estimates for the various NMIs, it 
is reasonable to base costs projections on the value distributions from the surveys.  
In particular, we assume that the cost of each NMI falls between some lower bound 
cost and the respondents‘ maximum submitted valuation (between $25,000 and 
$100,000, depending on the survey and NMI).  Thus, it is reasonable to simulate 
each NMI cost as falling within some range of the submitted valuation for that NMI. 
In each simulation trial, a random number (x%) was drawn for each NMI from 
a uniform distribution between 0% and 100%.  The NMI cost was then simulated as 
the lower bound cost plus x% of the range between the lower bound cost and the 
maximum submitted value.  For example, if the relevant cost range was between 
$5,000 and $25,000, a $20,000 range, and random percentage drawn was 25%, the 
simulated cost would equal $10,000; $5000 + (0.25*$20,000). 
To provide the broadest generality of results, two cost assignment methods 
were used: Varying Percentile Cost – All Positive (VP(AP)) and Varying Percentile 
Cost – High Positive (VP(HP)).  In the VP(AP) model, the lower bound for the cost of 
each NMI was the first positive value from the respondents‘ answers.  Thus, the cost 
of each NMI was drawn from the range of positive submitted values for that NMI.  
For a more conservative (higher) cost estimate, the VP(HP) model set the lower cost 
bound at the median of the VP(AP) cost range, or halfway between the first positive 
and maximum values.  Both costing schemes assumed constant marginal costs.  
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Additionally, the NMI values were assumed to be additive for Sailors who received 
more than one incentive—unless another value was given by the respondent.  
Similarly, costs were assumed to be additive for multiple NMIs. 
Finally, each Mechanism was simulated at the 25%, 50%, and 75% retention 
levels (see Table 8).  For perspective, the Navy‘s current overall Zone A, B, and C 
reenlistment rate goals are 48%, 58%, and 82%, respectively (Chief of Naval 
Operations, 2007, December). 
Table 8. Simulation Varieties 
 
2. Monetary Only Simulation 
To simulate the monetary-only auction, the survey responses were used to 
determine each Sailor‘s required cash SRB.  The Sailors were then ranked from 
most to least expensive.  The lowest set of n Sailors was retained, and each paid the 
cash bonus of the first excluded bid (i.e., the n+1st lowest bid).  The number of 
Sailors retained (n) varied according to the retention levels in Table 4.  
3. UIP Simulation 
Simulating the UIP requires determining when to include an NMI in the 
Universal Package.  To be the most "generous" to UIP and conservative with 
respect to CRAM's relative performance, we chose a cost cutoff to include an NMI in 
the UIP that was close to optimal for UIP, although this optimal cutoff would be 
impossible to determine in actual practice.  The optimal cost cutoff for each NMI was 
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calculated by determining the cost for which the total Sailor surplus (value minus 
cost summed over all Sailors with value greater than cost) equaled the total deficit 
(cost minus value summed over all Sailors with value less than cost).  This is the 
breakeven cost for an NMI to be included in the UIP; the Navy would realize a 
negative surplus if the UIP included NMIs with costs higher than this breakeven 
value; the Navy would realize a positive surplus if the UIP included NMIs with costs 
lower than this breakeven value. 
Figure 24 illustrates the optimal UIP cutoff percentile for each NMI in the 
SWO survey; Figure 25 provides the UIP cutoffs for the Enlisted Sailor Survey.  This 
is based on the sample‘s NMI value distribution.  It is important to note that these 
cutoffs are only truly optimal if the retained Sailors‘ value distribution matches the 
overall Sailors‘ value distribution.  If the retained Sailors actually value the NMIs 
more than the overall population, the optimal percentile would be higher.  
Conversely, if the retained Sailors actually value the NMIs less than the overall 
population, the optimal percentile would be lower. 
 























Figure 25. Optimal UIP Cutoff Percentile—Enlisted Sailor Survey 
Under the UIP mechanism, any NMI that the Navy offers is available to any 
retained Sailor.  All Sailors expressing a positive value for this incentive will clearly 
choose to use the incentive.  Some Sailors that do not express a willingness to pay 
for the NMI may still take advantage of the opportunity given that the incentive is 
offered at no charge.  Thus, a Sailor might have responded in the survey that 
receiving a particular NMI would not reduce his minimum required SRB; the same 
Sailor might, nonetheless, use that NMI if it were offered free of charge. Determining 
the total cost of retaining Sailors under UIP requires assumptions about NMI usage.  
Three assumptions were compared: 
1. UIP(0)—Only those Sailors who placed a positive value on the NMI will 
actually use it; 
2. UIP(50)—50% of those who place no value on the NMI will also use it; 
3. UIP(100)—Everyone retained will use the NMI. 
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Because the actual usage rate would be somewhere between UIP(0) and 
UIP(100), the average optimal cutoff would be approximately the 75th percentile, as 
is shown in Tables 9 and 10. 
Table 9. SWO Optimal UIP Cutoff Percentiles 
 
Table 10. Enlisted Optimal UIP Cutoff Percentiles 
 
The 75th percentile cost cutoff was used as the general rule in these 
simulations because it was consistent with the data regarding the optimal cutoff and 
because it was a simple, functional cutoff rule (and thus would be easier to use than 
a different cutoff rule for each NMI or some precise cutoff rule, such as 77.9%).  
Additionally, the UIP included only those NMIs that at least 25% of the Sailors 
valued more than their cost to provide (under the 75th percentile cutoff rule).  This 
included most of the NMIs, but not those whose costs would exceed more than 75% 
of the Sailor values.  
Note that the enlisted simulations using the VP(AP) costing scheme never 
offered more than a couple of NMIs in the UIP (e.g., barracks room on sea duty and 
BAH on sea duty for enlisted Sailors) because their first positive values occurred at 
the 88th and 84th percentiles, respectively.  Under the VP(HP) costing scheme, only 
three NMIs were offered in the enlisted UIP.  The other 10 NMIs‘ costs always 














































UIP(0) 75.5% 81.8% 84.6% 79.0% 74.8% 74.1%
UIP(50) 71.3% 67.1% 69.2% 71.3% 71.3% 71.3%






































































































































UIP(0) 68.0% 89.4% 75.8% 88.6% 85.2% 78.8% 82.9% 85.6% 85.6% 82.8% 97.3% 93.0% 91.2%
UIP(50) 67.7% 79.4% 74.3% 78.4% 76.8% 77.3% 71.6% 76.6% 75.5% 70.0% 93.2% 88.2% 83.3%
UIP(100) 67.3% 77.1% 73.5% 72.8% 75.8% 66.5% 69.8% 75.8% 74.5% 68.8% 91.4% 87.6% 71.8%
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UIP by preventing many situations in which NMI cost would exceed total Sailor 
value.  The SWO simulations were not as restrictive. 
To simulate the Universal Incentive Package, the initial SRB requirement 
(SRBI) was derived the same way as in the monetary auction: from the SRB cash 
values the Sailors provided in the survey.  The stated NMI values were used to 
determine the value each Sailor placed on each incentive.  If an incentive was 
included in the UIP, the Sailor‘s SRBI was reduced by the value stated for that NMI 
(ValueNMI) to generate a ―provisional‖ SRB bid for that Sailor.  This simulated the 
process by which Sailors would bid in a second-price auction given a fixed package 
of incentives.  Note that the Navy would not observe the Sailors‘ willingness to pay 
(WTP) for the non-monetary incentives under a UIP retention program; the Navy 
would only observe their adjusted SRB bid.  The Sailors were then ranked on their 
new provisional SRB bids.  Each retained Sailor received a monetary SRB equal to 
the first excluded provisional bid.  Retained Sailors were all eligible for the same 
cash bonus and a standardized NMI package, but each Sailor has individualized 
preferences—creating a unique ―value‖ for the NMIs offered. 
4. CRAM Simulation 
The CRAM simulations used the same initial SRB (SRBI), NMI value 
(ValueNMI) and NMI cost (CostNMI) determinations as above.  However, all NMIs were 
offered to all Sailors in this model; Sailors were only offered those SRBs for which 
the value exceeded the simulated cost (i.e., Sailor surplus was positive).  With this 
mechanism, the Navy observes both the Sailor‘s SRB bid and the value derived from 
each NMI.  The Sailors‘ provisional SRB (SRBP) was set equal to SRBI minus the 
value associated with each NMI allocated.  However, to mimic a generalized 
combinatorial second-price auction and ensure truthful revelation, Sailors were 
retained based on effective cost (CostE) to the Navy, using the following formula: 
CostE = SRBP + CostNMI 
where the CostNMI amounts were summed only over those NMIs allocated to 
that Sailor (i.e., those for which value exceeded cost). 
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Sailors were ranked from lowest to highest effective cost, and the least 
expensive set was retained.  The Navy‘s total cost of each individual retention 
package (CostT ) was equal to the CostE of the first excluded bidder: 
CostT = SRBI - ValueNMI + CostNMI. 
The cash award for each individual Sailor was determined by subtracting the 
cost of each allocated NMI from the Navy‘s total cost of the retention package 
(CostT).  Thus, each retained Sailor had the same cost to the Navy (CostT = CostE of 
the first excluded bidder).  However, each Sailor‘s cash award depended on the 
NMIs in the individualized package and their individual costs. 
Each Sailor received a value equal to their cash SRB plus their value for the 
NMIs in their individualized incentive package.  Values varied across Sailors, 
depending on the number of NMIs allocated and each Sailor‘s value. Nonetheless, in 
all cases, the value received by each retained Sailor equaled or exceeded the cost 
to the Navy of providing the retention incentive package. 
5. Simulation Runs 
For each retention level described in Table 8, 1,000 trials were simulated to 
obtain an adequate range of outcomes.  Both UIP and CRAM results were 
compared to the monetary auction.  It is important to note that these comparisons 
assume costs that were allowed to range over the positive portion of value 
distributions, with upper bounds commonly as large as $50,000 or more.  If true NMI 
costs are, in fact, in the lower range of the value distribution, the savings over 
monetary incentives may be significantly understated; if true costs are in the upper 
range of the value distribution, the savings over monetary incentives may be 
significantly overstated. 
B. Results 
Recall the two cost assignment methods used: Varying Percentile Cost, All 
Positive (VP(AP)), and Varying Percentile Cost, (High Positive (VP(HP)).  In the 
VP(AP) method, the lower bound for each NMI was based on the percentile that 
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included the first positive value from the respondents‘ answers.  The VP(HP) method 
set the lower bound halfway between the first positive percentile and 100, or the 
median of the VP(AP).  Tables 11 and 12 detail the lower-bound, mean, median, and 
maximum dollar amount for the entire VP(AP), from the SWO and enlisted surveys, 
respectively.  They also detail the lower bound and median for the VP(HP).  The 
VP(AP) mean costs in column 4 provide plausible cost estimates; however, to be 
conservative, the upper half of the VP(AP) range was also sampled to simulate the 
possibility of higher actual costs. 
It is clear from the figure that the VP(AP) lower-bound cost estimates are 
probably too low, as they range from $1 to $13.  What is not clear is where the 
estimated costs become reasonable.  For example, to provide a Second Class Petty 
Officer (with two dependents) with a one-year Sabbatical would cost at least $6,785 
(within the VP(AP) lower half)—the estimated cost to provide medical, dental, vision, 
and commissary benefits to that Sailor.  Additional costs of administering the 
program, retraining and potential lost productivity would add to that cost (possibly 
above the VP(HP) lower bound).  Appendices D and E contain the detailed results 
from the VP(AP) method, and Appendices F and G contain the detailed results from 
the VP(HP) method. 
 
Table 11. SWO Varying Cost Percentiles for NMI Cost Estimates 
 
Percentile Cost Percentile Cost Cost Percentile Cost Cost
Homeport 34 $100 67 $10,000 $10,694 84 $25,000 $75,000
Platform 53 $1 77 $5,000 $3,672 88 $10,000 $50,000
Billet 41 $1 71 $10,000 $7,229 85 $15,000 $70,000
One Year 
Sabbatical 51 $1 76 $20,000 $11,060 88 $25,000 $100,000
Telecommuting 43 $1 71 $11,434 $11,249 86 $25,000 $75,000
Geographic 
Stability (2 tours) 36 $1 68 $10,000 $11,707 84 $25,000 $75,000
VP(AP) Lower bound
VP(HP) Lower Bound 
VP(AP) Median
VP(AP) 
Mean VP(HP) Median                                                                                                                 Maximum
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Table 12. Enlisted Varying Cost Percentiles for NMI Cost Estimates 
 
1. Varying Percentile (AP) Cost Results 
As shown in Figures 26 and 27 for the SWO and enlisted surveys, 
respectively, the largest total dollar savings occurred at the highest retention level.  
The total CRAM savings increases as the Navy retains more Sailors.  For the SWO 
community, the CRAM dollar savings over purely monetary retention bonuses range 
from $914,000 to $7,929,000 as retention rates increase from 25% to 75%; CRAM 
dollar savings over purely monetary retention bonuses range from $3,640,000 to 
$11,254,000 as retention rates increase from25% to 75% in the enlisted community. 
Percentile Cost Percentile Cost Cost Percentile Cost Cost*
Homeport 35 $1 67.5 $10,000 $9,749 83.75 $10,000 $50,000
Platform 64 $1 82 $5,000 $7,066 91 $10,000 $50,000
Billet 40 $1 70 $5,000 $8,917 85 $10,000 $51,502
One Year 
Sabbatical 63.5 $1 81.75 $10,000 $12,917 90.875 $20,000 $65,000
Telecommuting 50 $13 75 $7,750 $11,661 87.5 $15,000 $70,000
Geographic 
Stability (2 tours) 51 $7 75.5 $5,539 $9,385 87.75 $10,000 $50,000
Geographic 
Stability (3 tours) 47 $1 73.5 $10,000 $12,460 86.75 $15,000 $80,000
Professional 
Certification 62 $1 81 $5,000 $9,524 90.5 $10,000 $60,000
Compressed Work 
Week 60 $1 80 $5,000 $8,157 90 $10,000 $41,026
Transferability of 
GI Bill 45.5 $1 72.75 $10,000 $12,405 86.375 $20,000 $75,000
Single Barracks 
Room on sea duty 88.5 $1 94.25 $3,000 $5,446 97.125 $5,650 $25,000
BAH on sea duty 84 $1 92 $5,400 $8,923 96 $10,000 $50,000
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Figure 26. SWO Average Dollar Savings—VP(AP) 
 
 
Figure 27. Enlisted Average Dollar Savings—VP(AP) 
While the total CRAM savings are higher at higher retention rates, so are total 
retention costs.  Percent cost savings are more complicated.  With purely monetary 
retention incentives, the Navy retains Sailors with low monetary incentive 
requirements at lower retention rates, while they are forced to retain Sailors with 
higher monetary incentive requirements at higher retention rates.  The cost savings 
from CRAM and the UIP depend on the relationship between the monetary costs to 













































between monetary retention requirements and NMI values (i.e., Sailors requiring low 
monetary retention bonuses have low NMI values, and vice versa), the percent 
savings would likely increase as retention rates increase, yielding a higher percent 
savings at the higher retention levels.  The percent cost savings from CRAM and 
UIP would be more apt to decrease as retention rates increase if there was not a 
direct relationship between monetary retention requirements and NMI values.  
Figures 28 and 29 show these results for the SWO and Enlisted surveys, 
respectively.  For the VP(AP) SWO simulations, CRAM produced an average 
savings ranging from 28.3% to 42.3% over monetary; the Enlist CRAM savings 
ranged from 34.3% to 80.4%.   
 


























Figure 29. Enlisted Average Percent Savings—VP(AP) 
2. Varying Percentile (HP) Cost Results 
The Varying Percentile (HP) simulations measure the potential CRAM and 
UIP cost savings with higher NMI costs.  As NMI costs increase, CRAM and UIP 
cost savings will decrease, but the effect is more significant for the UIP.  Recall that 
the Universal Incentive Package can produce large benefits to the Navy when many 
Sailors value an incentive more than its cost.  This is shown in Figure 30 by the 
green shaded areas in cases 30a and 30b.  Because all Sailors who place any value 
on the incentive receive it (even if the Navy‘s cost exceeds that value), there is also 
a potential for a significant deficit associated with this incentive.  This is shown by 
the red shaded areas in Figure 30 for cases 30a and 30b.  As NMI costs increase, 
the potential surplus under UIP decreases (green shaded area) while the potential 
deficit increases (red shaded area).  The potential deficit can be exacerbated if 
Sailors who express no value for an NMI choose to use it anyway when provided to 
all under UIP. 
CRAM avoids these deficits by offering Sailors individualized NMI packages 
that only include NMIs for which that Sailor‘s value exceeds the Navy‘s cost.  In 
addition, CRAM provides additional savings because it can offer NMIs excluded from 
























only a small group of Sailors.  The Navy captures additional surplus value by 
including these NMIs in CRAM, as illustrated by the blue shaded areas in cases 30c 
and 30d in Figure 30.  Under CRAM, the Navy can offer incentives that are highly 
valued by a small group of Sailors.   
 
Figure 30. Limitations of a Universal Incentive Package  
(After Coughlan et al., 2008) 
In the simulations reported here, the Universal Incentive Package generally 
realized cost savings compared to the monetary auction under the UIP(0) 
assumption—assuming that NMIs are only used by Sailors who expressed a positive 
value.  Under the UIP(100) assumption (all retained Sailors use the NMI), the result 
could show a significant Navy deficit, particularly with the higher NMI costs in the 
VP(HP) scenario.  Dollar cost savings are provided in Figures 31 and 32 for the 
SWO and Enlisted surveys, respectively.  Recall that these results assume a 75% 
NMI cost cutoff; the Navy only includes the NMIs that are the least likely to have total 
cost exceed total Sailor value, reflecting a ―best case‖ UIP scenario (and the Navy 
can not identify the best case cost NMI cost cutoff in practice).  Even with this ―best 




Figure 31. SWO Average Dollar Savings VP(HP) 
 
Figure 32. Enlisted Average Dollar Savings VP(HP) 
The percent cost savings for CRAM and UIP are provided in Figures 33 and 
34 for the SWO and enlisted surveys respectively.  CRAM only allocates incentives 
to Sailors who value that incentive more than it costs.  This makes it the most 
efficient method of distributing benefits.  In every case, the CRAM Auction provided 












































provided in Appendices D – G).  CRAM provided a higher percentage cost savings 
than the UIP in all cases, as well. 
The VP(HP) trials imposed a particularly stringent NMI cost cutoff for inclusion 
in the UIP, which worked to the advantage of UIP by not offering excessively 
―wasteful‖ NMIs.  In the vast majority of cases, CRAM produced savings well above 
those of the UIP—especially when 50% or more of the UIP re-enlistees were 
assumed to use the non-monetary incentives, though they expressed no value 
(UIP(50)) and UIP(100)).  In the VP(HP) simulations, CRAM savings vs. monetary 
averaged from 5.5% to 37.3% for the SWO survey and 25.5% to 39.9% for the 
Enlisted survey.  UIP vs. monetary savings ranged from a deficit of 9.7% to a 
savings of 14.6% in the SWO survey; UIP vs. monetary savings ranged from a 
deficit of 3.3% (UIP(100)) to a savings of only 4.8% (UIP(0)) for the Enlisted survey.   
CRAM is able to overcome the weakness of the UIP by capturing the entire 
potential Navy surplus and eliminating the waste (cases in which the Navy‘s cost 
exceeds the Sailors‘ value).  CRAM also captures the surplus from incentives that 
would not be offered under the Universal Incentive Package. 
 





















































VII. Linking Preferences to Diversity 
As leaders, we must anticipate and embrace the demographic changes of 
tomorrow, and build a Navy that always reflects our Country‘s make up. We 
must lead in ways that will continue to draw men and women to service to our 
Country and to our Navy. Diversity of thoughts, ideas, and competencies of 
our people, keeps our Navy strong, and empowers the protection of the very 
freedoms and opportunities we enjoy each and every day. (Roughead, 2008, 
February 28) 
A. Motivation 
Why is diversity important to the military?  If achieved prudently and 
purposefully, it can enhance the political legitimacy, social equity, and the 
effectiveness of our military institutions.  If applied arbitrarily, capriciously, or to 
achieve some notion of perfect representation, the resulting force will suffer on all 
three accounts.  
This section will address each of the three core areas of concern—political 
legitimacy, social equity, and the effectiveness of the military with respect to 
population representation—to bear out each one‘s respective significance.  It will 
then address representation in terms of new hires (known as ―accessions‖ in the 
military) versus career force structure.  Finally, it will discuss how, through 
reenlistment incentives, the military can achieve the optimal approximate 
representation desired/required by the society it is sworn to protect.  
B. Statistical Representation Defined 
Before discussing the three core areas of concern and how to address them, 
a brief discussion of statistical representation is necessary.  It is important for the 
Nation‘s population to be statistically represented in the military.  This does not 
mean ―perfect representation.‖  Rather, it means representation within the 
acceptable range determined by society: acceptable approximate representation 
(Eitelberg, 2008).  But what defines the range of acceptable deviations from perfect 
representation is highly dependent on the current attitudes and priorities of the 
country, as well as on the current statutes in effect.  For example, prior to 1972, 
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there was a statutory ceiling on the percentage of women allowed in the military.  It 
is no accident that the height of the women‘s rights movement coincided with the lift 
on that restriction. 
The arguments that are made for moving toward or away from perfect 
statistical representation center around three areas: 
Military effectiveness—meeting the need for personnel who are capable of 
performing military jobs; social equity—spreading the burden of national 
defense across all segments of the population; and political legitimacy—
involving the belief that the military ought to be part of society rather separate 
from it (Eitelberg, 1977; as cited in CBO, 1989, p. 5). 
Dr. Eitelberg discusses these three issues as ―a core of concern around an 
age old question: Who shall serve when not all serve?‖ (Eitelberg, 2008).  
Additionally, most often the military focuses on accessions and shifts policies 
to affect enlistment proportions while ignoring the reality that many of the 
―undesirable‖ representation issues are a function of who chooses to stay versus 
who chooses to join (CBO, 1989, p. 15).  Perfect representation is not possible 
because, by its nature, the military is exclusionary: there are age limits, physical 
ability minimums, and fitness standards that are necessary to ensure minimum 
requirements for service (1989, p. 14).  Even if the United States reinstated a 
random draft, it could not achieve perfect representation due to these limitations.  
What is more interesting is trying to determine where the right level of representation 
lies and how to achieve it. 
C. Political Legitimacy 
Throughout its history, the United States has had a significant distrust of a 
standing Army.  This pattern can be traced back to the Revolutionary War, when the 
Continental Army was disbanded after the colonies gained independence.  It has 
been borne out, time and again, following significant military campaigns.  The 
framers of the Constitution were influenced by their experiences with the ubiquitous 
armies of Europe and their oppression of the people they were bound to protect.  
They recognized a need for a ―common defense‖ but were leery of giving too much 
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power or substance to that same body (Segal & Segal, 2004, pp. 1-2).  Another 
common theme in the Nation‘s history has been the quest to create a military that 
―looks like‖ American society.  This is presumably to quell the fear of a standing 
army.  If society shares a common ground with the military, it will either avoid 
conflicts of interest or a military subculture of ―violent minded‖ individuals that would 
rise up against the people (CBO, 2007, p. 11).  ―Political legitimacy is most 
commonly associated with geographic representation because of presumed regional 
differences in attitudes toward the military (Eitelberg, 1979; as cited in CBO, 1989, p. 
15).‖   
From a civilian point-of-view, those needs have formed the genesis for the 
quest for political legitimacy.  For the military, political legitimacy is crucial to obtain 
funding, aid, and comfort from the Nation‘s citizens.  Additionally, ensuring more 
geographical representation would be more likely to produce political leaders with 
military backgrounds and experience who would ―grasp the complexities of defense 
policy [through their] first-hand experience with the military‖ (CBO, 1989, p. 2)  Yet, 
in terms of enlisted accessions, the southern United States continues to be 
overrepresented and the northeast continues to be underrepresented.  ―The 
representation ratio (percentage of accessions divided by percentage of 18-24 year-
olds from the region) for active accessions from the South was 1.2, compared to 0.7 
for the Northeast, 0.9 for the North Central, and 1.0 for the West‖ (OSD(P&R), 
2005a, p. vii).  This unbalanced distribution may have a negative impact on both the 
civilian and military needs for political legitimacy.   
D. Social Equity 
In contrast, social equity has been a relatively recent concern with respect to 
military service.  There are countless examples of inequality and discrimination in 
the Nation‘s history.  Consequently, these inequities have characterized its military 
institutions.  But the United States has evolved into a socially conscious society well 
on its way to achieving equal opportunity and social equity.  Understandably, the 




The concern of social equity is centered on the issue of the ―burden‖ of 
service (CBO, 1989, p. 8).  The element of social equity becomes increasingly 
important to society in a time of war when burdens appear to outweigh benefits.  The 
argument is that the physical dangers and personal sacrifice of military service are 
endured by the poor and minorities in higher proportion to their representation in 
society as a whole.  This hypothesis is supported with historical anecdotes 
referencing military exemptions that range from paying a substitute to serve on one‘s 
behalf to waivers of service for college students—all of which favor the wealthy and 
privileged (CBO, 2007, pp. 3-5). 
On the surface, the unequal burden hypothesis appears to continue to be 
true.  The 2007 CBO study, however, showed this situation to be diminishing: 
African Americans were still overrepresented in the force, but underrepresented in 
new accessions. In addition, the ―CBO analysis suggests that youths are 
represented […] at all socioeconomic levels.  However, young people from the 
lowest income and highest income families are less likely to be represented in the 
enlisted force than their peers‖ (CBO, 2007, p. 30).  This appears to refute the claim 
that the very poor are shouldering the majority of the burden.  Additionally, ―black 
recruits were more likely to come from the highest black family incomes; a change 
from earlier in the decade‖ (CBO, 2007, p. 29).  This suggests that the assertion of 
―economic conscription‖ (CBO, 1989, p. 9) of minorities may be overstated.   
Furthermore, representation in the military does not necessarily equate to 
―burden‖ in terms of physical danger and risk of death.  In an investigation of the 
racial and ethnic makeup of the combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan through 
December 2006, the 2007 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) study found that 
while representation in those theaters was an accurate reflection of the racial and 
ethnic representation in the force,  
[W]hite service members have a higher representation in combat operations 
(75[%]) than in the force as a whole (68[%]), whereas black service members 
have a lower representation in those occupations (13[%]) than in the overall 
force (19[%]) […]. Data on fatalities indicate that minorities are not (emphasis 
added) being killed in those operations at a greater rate than their 
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representation in the force.  Rather, fatalities of white service members have 
been higher than their representation in the force (76[%] of deaths in those 
two theaters through December 2006). (CBO, 2007, p. ix)  
But even if the burdens of military service are disproportionately shouldered 
by certain groups, the individuals in those groups receive benefits that might not be 
available elsewhere (CBO, 1989, p. 11).  Even if the claim of economic 
conscription—where underprivileged youth are forced to choose between enlistment 
and unemployment—is valid, the alternative may be much worse: unemployment is 
the only answer (1989, pp. 10-11).  
Another benefit to military service is the absence of gender discrimination: 
―Sixteen percent of female officers and 34 percent of enlisted women are black 
compared with 9 percent of male officers and 20 percent of enlisted men […] many 
black women see the military as providing greater opportunities and benefits than 
the civilian labor market‖ (Segal & Segal, 2004, p. 19). 
The numbers on recruitment do not tell the whole story.  In fact, when the 
career force is considered, a different representation tale is told.  While African 
Americans show an increase in proportions from accessions to force structure, 
women and Hispanics show a decrease.  This reflects a disparity in what drives 
enlistment with what drives retention.  Women show a lower propensity to reenlist.  If 
the goal is to raise the proportion of women, or at least to maintain the present level, 
the military has two options: recruit more women to account for the higher non-
reenlistments (a costly proposition) or institute policies to retain more women.   
There are limits to the degree to which the military should strive to achieve 
social equity, however.  The nature of its business rightfully excludes certain 
members of society.  The aged, infirm, and the young are three groups that are 
completely unrepresented in the military.  This is because the cost of their presence 
in terms of lost military effectiveness would far outweigh the benefits to social equity.  
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E. Military Effectiveness 
Approximate representation in terms of Social Equity and Political Legitimacy 
is desirable and necessary, but only up to the point at which it begins to hinder 
military effectiveness.  Determining where that point lies is beyond the scope of this 
paper.  History, however, has shown that military effectiveness must take 
precedence over the desire for social equity and political legitimacy when these 
goals are conflicting. 
Examples of this trade-off abound.  Women represent almost 50% of the 
eligible population, yet comprise slightly less than 15% of the active duty force.  
Since the statutory ceiling on the percentage of women in the force was lifted in 
1972, there has been a very slow and calculated increase in the proportion of 
women who serve.  Increasing the percentage of women in the force more quickly 
would have produced extreme logistical difficulties and hindered the military‘s ability 
to achieve its mission.  Women are still forbidden to serve in approximately 20% of 
all military positions, including ground combat units (Segal & Segal, 2004, p. 18).  
The failure to require women to register for the draft underscores the negative effect 
that perfect representation would have on military effectiveness.  This illustrates the 
military‘s deliberate ―correction‖ of social inequity to reflect current attitudes and 
priorities while preserving military effectiveness. 
Minimum education, physical, and moral standards are required for 
enlistment.  Relaxing these standards would most likely increase the level of 
representation of certain groups, but at a cost to effectiveness that is unacceptable 
to decision-makers.  The 1989 CBO report shows that more than 90% of total-force 
recruits were high school graduates, compared with the less than 80% graduation 
rate of their civilian counterparts.  Additionally, a force that perfectly represented the 
Nation in terms of aptitude would include 23% of the Nation‘s youths who scored 
between 10 and 30 on the Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT).  Currently, the 
service-wide average is less than 10% of those individuals.  United States law 
forbids joining by those that score below 10 on the AFQT.  Education and aptitude 
are currently the best measures of effectiveness available.  Therefore, the CBO 
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explains, ―military effectiveness now argues for maintaining the clearly 
unrepresentative nature, in terms of education and test scores, of the recruits being 
brought in under the All Volunteer Force [which is unrepresentative in those terms]‖ 
(1989, p. 8).  These findings continue in the CBO 2007 report: ―In 2006, 69[%] of 
recruits scored at or above the [50th] percentile [category IIIA and above], relative to 
the overall United States youth population‖ (pp. 15-16).  This assertion is supported 
by the CBO‘s 2007 report that states that the percentage of enlistees with High 
School Diplomas continues to outpace the civilian population by the same degree. 
F. Accession Representation versus Force Representation 
Certainly, recruitment representation is important in any analysis of the 
demographic shape of today‘s military.  It, however, only tells part of the story.  The 
make-up of the career force is equally, if not more, important and is a related 
consequence of the composition of accessions.  Today‘s career force does not look 
the same as the accessions that feed it, however.  There is a disconnect between 
incentives to join the military and decisions to stay in the military.  African Americans 
are under-represented in terms of accessions (13% in 2005), but overrepresented in 
terms of career force (19% in 2006) compared to 14% of the overall population.  
Women joined at a rate of 16.5%, yet, in 2004, the total force percentage was only 
14.8%.  In 2004, 12.9% of accessions were Hispanic, yet only 9.8% of the total force 
was represented, compared to that ethnicity contributing to 16.4% of the eligible 
population (OSD(P&R), 2005a).  In force-shaping endeavors, the Navy must 
determine why this disparity occurs and strive to provide reenlistment incentives to 
achieve the optimal mix of recruits.   
G. CRAM’s Force-diversification Potential: Enlisted Survey7 
For a 25% retention rate, 151 of 604 Sailors were retained under all retention 
mechanisms simulated.  Under the CRAM auction, depending on the NMIs offered, 
a different set of Sailors was retained.  This contrasts with those retained under the 
                                            
7 There was insufficient data to replicate this analysis for the SWO survey.  This discussion pertains 
specifically to the enlisted survey, though the general issues cross all Navy populations. 
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strictly monetary retention auction.  Some Sailors were present in both groups 
(overlap).  For example, when all 13 NMIs were offered, the overlap was 45 Sailors.  
This means 106 different Sailors were retained by offering NMIs.  But, who are these 
Sailors and how does their retention affect the demographic composition of the 
fleet?  
To test the effects of offering different combinations of NMIs, five CRAM 
auctions were simulated.  The researchers adjusted the offerings to produce the 
largest positive increase in the following groups: females, African Americans (black), 
Hispanics, Sailors with an Associate‘s Degree or higher, and Sailors age 27 and 
under.  As costing data was unknown, the cost of incentives was assumed to be 
zero to fully compare relative values.  The 25% retention rate was used to capture 
the individuals with the highest values for the individual NMIs. 
The sample was too small and narrow to prove any differences statistically 
significant or applicable to the entire enlisted force, but the findings deserve mention 
and further study.  Appendix H contains results of selected NMI combinations and 
their impacts on representation by gender, race/ethnicity, education level, and age.  
Note: there are cases when the results from this sample show a decrease in 
retention of certain protected groups.  Policy-makers must be careful to ensure that 
offering NMIs does not have an adverse impact on diversity.  
1. Gender 
By offering choice of homeport and billet only, CRAM produced the largest 
positive change in female representation.  This group increased five percentage 
points from 16% of those retained to 21%.  This resulted in just over a 30% increase 
in retention.  This implies, for this sample, homeport and billet choices are the most 
valuable non-monetary incentives to these women.  While sabbatical, 
telecommuting, and compressed workweek did not produce the largest increase, the 
inclusion of these benefits also increased female retention, as shown in Table 7. 
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Table 13. Gender Representation with CRAM 
Gender SRB 
Only 








Female 16% 21% 19% 18% 19% 17% 
Male 81% 77% 79% 81% 79% 82% 
No 
Answer 
3% 2% 2% 1% 2% 1% 
 
In this sample, almost 53% of the females were ACs.  Under the monetary 
auction, the retained female ACs represented just over 20% of the females in the 
sample.  When the five NMIs listed in Table 5 were offered, the female ACs retained 
represented only 16% of the females in the sample.  Put another way, 
representation of retained female FCs increased—from just over 5% of the females 
in the sample to almost 11%.  With only choice of homeport and billet offered, ACs 
represented 24% of the females and FCs just fewer than 10%.  This may be 
because the benefits offered under sabbatical, telecommuting, and compressed 
workweek are more appealing to FC women as their rate spends 70% of its time at 
sea.  Or it could be that female ACs do not find these options necessary or feasible, 
as they are in a shore-intensive, fixed-schedule job.  In any case, the results may not 
be applicable to the entire enlisted population.  This underscores the necessity of a 
more rigorous analysis involving a larger and more diverse sample. 
2. Race/Ethnicity 
Two demographic groups were identified for these simulations: African 
American (black) and Hispanic.   
a. African American 
Figure 35 compares the results of a monetary-only auction and a CRAM 
auction offering choice of homeport, compressed workweek and lump-sum SRB.  
Again, the results show an increase in the percentage of blacks retained—implying, 




Figure 35. Black Representation with CRAM 
b. Hispanic 
For Hispanics in this sample, the most valuable NMIs appeared to be choice 
of platform, two-tour geographic stability, professional certification and lump-sum 
SRB.  Figure 36 displays the contrast in representation between the monetary-only 
auction simulation and the CRAM auction with the above offerings.  The increase in 
Hispanic representation is just over 44%. 
 
Figure 36. Hispanic Representation with CRAM 
3.  Education 
If the Navy is to attract personnel with higher levels of education, the results 
of this sample‘s CRAM auction suggest that offering a choice of homeport, choice of 
platform, sabbatical, telecommuting, compressed work week, a barracks room while 
on sea duty, and a lump-sum SRB could increase the representation of this group.  
In this sample, the percent of retained Sailors with an Associate‘s Degree or higher 




Figure 37. Education Level Representation with CRAM 
4. Age  
The respondents were grouped into four different age groups representing 
three ―generations‖: Baby Boomers (those over 42), Generation X (age 28-42), and 
Generation Y (age 21-27 and those under 21).  According to the 2005 Population 
Representation in the Military Services (OSD(P&R), 2005a), Generation Y Sailors 
comprise 62% of the force; Generation X accounts for almost 35%; and the 
remaining 3% consist of Baby Boomers.  The representation of Generation Y Sailors 
will only increase as the Baby Boomers and older Generation X Sailors retire.  The 
sample from the Enlisted Retention Survey was almost 57% Generation Y, 40% 
Generation X, and just over 2% Baby Boomers.  
As Figure 38 illustrates, 45% of retained Sailors—retained with a monetary-
only incentive—were from Generation Y.  With a CRAM auction offering choice of 
platform, choice of billet, sabbatical, telecommuting, three-tour geographic stability, 
professional certification, compressed work week, a barracks room while on sea 




Figure 38. Age Representation with CRAM  
H. Summary 
This chapter demonstrates CRAM‘s potential as a force-diversification tool, 
although it only addresses diversity in terms of retention—not accessions, attrition, 
or promotion—and only has been applied to the enlisted populations surveyed here.  
It is important to note that CRAM achieves enhanced diversity without giving 
particular retention preference to any group.  It simply offers what is most important 
to its members in the hopes of increasing their retention. 
The reader should nonetheless realize that these results are not conclusive.  
The sample is too small and narrow in scope for statistical inference.  The results do, 
however, show CRAM‘s potential effect on population representation.  
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VIII. Summary, Conclusions, and 
Recommendations 
A. Summary 
This research addressed the potential retention and cost impacts of providing 
an optimal individualized portfolio of non-monetary and monetary incentives to 
influence reenlistment and retention behavior in SWOs and enlisted Sailors. 
The SWO and Enlisted Retention Survey and subsequent auction simulations 
showed: 
1. A combinatorial auction mechanism providing individualized portfolios of 
non-monetary and monetary incentives, promising a more cost-effective 
means to influence reenlistment/retention behavior over monetary 
incentives alone. 
2. A way to determine the optimal mix of monetary/non-monetary incentives 
that would be both valued by Sailors and cost-effective for the Navy. 
3. An auction design that would allow the Navy to tailor monetary/non-
monetary reenlistment incentive packages to individual Sailors while 
simultaneously economizing Navy resources. 
4. The potential cost savings the Navy might expect by moving from purely 
monetary reenlistment incentives to a portfolio of monetary/non-monetary 
incentives—if both reenlistment incentive programs are optimally 
designed. 
5. How population representation might be affected by offering these 
reenlistment incentives. 
This report focused on exploring three mechanisms for administrating enlisted 
retention: a purely monetary auction, a Universal Incentive Package (UIP) auction, 
and the Combinatorial Retention Auction Mechanism (CRAM).   
The mechanisms were simulated, their outcomes compared, and their 
respective strengths and weaknesses explored.  CRAM clearly outperformed the 
monetary and UIP auctions.  Cost savings to the Navy ranged from 6% – 42% over 
monetary incentives in the SWO survey and from 25% – 80% in the Enlisted survey.  
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While the UIP was shown to be simpler in implementation than the version of CRAM 
simulated here, the potential for a significant deficit (with UIP) was illustrated both 
conceptually and in the simulations.  While not the focus of this research, CRAM 
auction variants can be designed to simplify implementation while retaining the 
essential CRAM performance characteristics, as discussed below in the 
implementation section.  The final product is a retention approach that is applicable 
to any community (enlisted or officer, surface or aviation) by simply changing the 
offerings and associated reservation values. 
Additionally, this research addressed the force-diversifying potential of 
CRAM.  For the Enlisted sample used, it was shown that offering certain non-
monetary incentives changed the demographic mix of Sailors retained.  Due to the 
small sample size, these results are not conclusive, but do provide support for 
further research. 
Another benefit of CRAM that can perhaps not be quantified is the 
psychological benefits of choice.  If Sailors were able to choose the benefits that 
best suit them, they would be more likely to recognize the true composition of their 
total rewards package and may also realize an increase in value by having a voice in 
their compensation.  By allowing Sailors to choose only those benefits which suit 
them, the Navy can eliminate the waste associated with unwanted benefits while 
empowering its members. 
B. Conclusions 
There already exists substantial research that supports the effectiveness of a 
Total Rewards approach to compensation.  There is also evidence that an auction 
mechanism to determine proper bonus levels would be beneficial to manpower 
analysts.  This research combines these two notions into a tool for planners to 





The essential element in a combinatorial auction is variability in preferences.  
There are several sources of variability in preferences.  These include:  
1. Variability across NMIs (on average, some are more valuable than others). 
a. NMIs should be selected carefully. 
2. Variability across populations (on average; different populations may 
prefer different NMIs). 
a. NMIs offered should vary across populations (e.g., SWOs versus 
enlisted Sailors). 
3. Variability within a population (individuals within a population value NMIs 
differently). 
a. Individualized NMI packages are more effective than universal 
packages. 
4. Variability within the individual (values for combinations of NMIs may be 
additive, super-additive or sub-additive relative to the values for the 
individual NMIs in that package). 
a. CRAM must consider the information elicitation issue (do we need 
values for all incentives and potential packages?). 
The CRAM variant described in this research addresses all four of these 
preference variability issues.  In contrast, UIP can address the first two issues— 
variability across NMIs and variability across populations—as long as NMIs are 
selected carefully and are targeted to individual populations (which does not seem to 
be the case to date in military applications).  However, the CRAM variant described 
here, which can be considered the ―full-information‖ CRAM, is information intensive; 
it assumes an auction developer has full information about each Sailor‘s value for 
the individual incentives and every possible combination of incentives.  
Unfortunately, the value of NMI combinations is not always the sum of values for the 
individual NMIs.  Combination values can be super-additive if the NMIs are 
complements, or sub-additive if the NMIs are substitutes.  The SWO and Enlisted 
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survey data shows significant incidence of all three cases: additive, super-additive 
and sub-additive preferences. 
Further research will explore the implications of variability in NMI values 
within the individual.  In particular, it will explore the feasibility of simply assuming 
preferences are additive across combinations.  The risk is that some individuals with 
super-additive preferences may not be retained when they would choose to be 
retained and that the Navy will expect to retain some individuals with sub-additive 
preferences when they will choose not to be retained.  However, the extent of this 
problem is questionable and amenable to empirical analysis; assuming that NMI 
values are additive may be a workable simplification.  Preliminary work on 
preference elicitation indicates that there is little effect on the final outcome if the 
auction is implemented assuming additive valuations (Ellis, 2009). 
An alternative way to implement CRAM would be a ―cafeteria-style‖ plan in 
which Sailors are given a menu of NMIs along with their associated costs.  Each 
Sailor would select which NMIs to include in his/her retention package.  The Sailor 
would understand that the listed cost for any NMI selected would be added to his 
requested SRB amount to determine his total retention cost (and, thus, his likelihood 
of being retained).  Each Sailor would be best served by selecting only the NMIs he 
values as much or more than their cost.  After choosing from the available NMIs, 
each Sailor would then submit a cash bid indicating the minimum amount he would 
require for reenlistment, given that he would also receive his selected NMIs. 
A further extension of this system is a two-phase reenlistment process.  
Sailors would bid on the NMIs in an open auction for the six months prior to their 
retention season.  After ―winning‖ his provisional NMIs, a Sailor would participate in 
the next season‘s retention auction, bidding for retention with his individualized 
package of incentives. 
After identifying the advantages and disadvantages of alternative approaches 
to implementing CRAM, the authors suggest implementing these auctions on a small 
scale, with one or two ratings, in a pilot program.  This approach will allow planners 
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and participants to become comfortable with the new system and to work out any 
issues that may arise. 
Implementation of a Navy-wide retention auction would require substantially 
reworking the current reenlistment system.  Mass reenlistment ―seasons‖ would 
have to be established to obtain sufficient numbers for each auction.  A Sailor could 
still maintain his current end of obligated service (EAOS), but he would be required 
to commit to additional obligated service during the reenlistment season prior to his 
EAOS.  An example would be quarterly reenlistment seasons (e.g., in January, April, 
July and September).  If a Sailor‘s EAOS was May 8, he would be required to 
participate in the January reenlistment season auction and commit, at that time, to 
reenlisting on or before May 8.  This system would have an additional benefit of 
preventing billet gaps that ensue from unplanned EAOS losses. 
2. Further Research 
Further research is definitely warranted.  The data used in the simulations 
was relatively small, and the scope was relatively narrow (junior SWOs, E-6 and 
below Navy ACS and FCs).  The model itself, however, can easily be adapted to 
accommodate a larger sample and more diverse group.  The authors suggest 
administering further Navy-wide retention surveys, similar to those in Appendices A 
and B, to obtain value distributions for additional populations that can be used for 
statistical inference. 
Accurate cost data is also essential to determine this mechanism‘s cost-
saving potential.  Research is presently ongoing to discover theses costs.  This 
research assumed constant marginal costs for all NMIs and based NMI costs on the 
distribution of NMI values.  The primary issue to resolve is the constant marginal 
cost assumption.  If marginal costs increase with usage, the CRAM model would be 
more complicated to implement.  If appropriate, an increasing marginal cost CRAM 
variant will be developed. 
Finally, further work is needed to identify the CRAM variant that balances 
fidelity of the results with ease of implementation.  This will require exploring whether 
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it is appropriate to assume additive preferences and to compare those results to the 
Menu CRAM.  Experiments to verify the mechanism‘s performance are also 
warranted.  These investigations should precede any pilot test. 
Providing a Total Rewards package—including monetary and non-monetary 
benefits individually tailored to meet the needs of each individual Sailor—is a lofty 
goal.  However, it is attainable and worth the effort.  Using CRAM, the Navy can 
potentially save hundreds of thousands of dollars in wasted benefits and empower 
its members by giving them a voice in their compensation: a ―win-win‖ situation.
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Appendix C. SRB and NMI Value Distributions 
For presentation purposes, all figures were truncated at 40% on the vertical 
axis.  On the horizontal axis, the SRB Requirements Distribution display was 
truncated at $150,000, and the Value Distribution displays were truncated at 
$30,000.  Percent of Responses used all observations. 
Mean and maximum values were calculated excluding outliers where 
indicated (*).  Outliers were defined as SRB Requirements of $500,000 and above 
and NMI Values of $100,000 and above.  There were three observations in the 
enlisted survey that contained outlier values.  There were seven individual NMI 
outlier values in this survey: one each for homeport choice, billet choice, 
telecommuting, three-tour geographic stability, professional certification, and two for 
platform choice.  The SWO survey included a smaller sample of NMIs. 
 



























































































































Figure 40. Enlisted Required SRB Distribution 
 
 














































































































































































































Mean*      $47,978 
Mode (13%)     $50,000 
25th Percentile     $25,000 
Median      $45,000 
75th Percentile     $70,000 
90th Percentile      
$89,000 
95th Percentile    
$100,000 




Figure 42. Enlisted Homeport Value Distribution 
 
 






















































































































































































Mean*        $6,358 
Mode (33%)               $0 
25th Percentile               $0 
Median        $5,000 
75th Percentile     $10,000 
90th Percentile      
$20,000 
95th Percentile      
$25,000 




Figure 44. Enlisted Platform Value Distribution 
 
 






















































































































































































Mean*        $2,563 
Mode (59%)               $0 
25th Percentile               $0 
Median                $0 
75th Percentile       $2,136 
90th Percentile      
$10,000 
95th Percentile      
$10,000 




Figure 46. Enlisted Billet Value Distribution 
 
 






















































































































































































Mean*        $5,357 
Mode (38%)               $0 
25th Percentile               $0 
Median        $2,000 
75th Percentile     $10,000 
90th Percentile      
$15,000 
95th Percentile      
$20,000 




Figure 48. Enlisted Sabbatical Value Distribution 
 
 






















































































































































































Mean        $4,706 
Mode (59%)               $0 
25th Percentile               $0 
Median                $0 
75th Percentile       $5,000 
90th Percentile      
$15,000 
95th Percentile      
$25,000 




Figure 50. Enlisted Telecommuting Value Distribution 
 
 






























































































































































































Mean*        $5,862 
Mode (47%)               $0 
25th Percentile               $0 
Median                $1 
75th Percentile       $7,500 
90th Percentile      
$20,000 
95th Percentile      
$25,000 




Figure 52. Enlisted Geographic Stability (2 Tours) Value Distribution 
 
 














































































































































































Mean        $4,609 
Mode (47%)               $0 
25th Percentile               $0 
Median                $0 
75th Percentile       $5,000 
90th Percentile      
$12,800 
95th Percentile      
$20,000 
Maximum     $50,000 
Mean*        $6,620 
Mode (44%)               $0 
25th Percentile               $0 
Median        $1,000 
75th Percentile     $10,000 
90th Percentile      
$20,000 
95th Percentile      
$35,000 




Figure 54. Enlisted Professional Certification Value Distribution 
 
 














































































































































































Mean*        $3,627 
Mode (56%)               $0 
25th Percentile               $0 
Median                $0 
75th Percentile       $5,000 
90th Percentile      
$10,000 
95th Percentile      
$20,000 
Maximum*     $60,000 
Mean        $3,289 
Mode (55%)               $0 
25th Percentile               $0 
Median                $0 
75th Percentile       $5,000 
90th Percentile      
$10,000 
95th Percentile      
$15,000 




Figure 56. GI Bill Transferability Value Distribution 
 
 














































































































































































Mean        $6,678 
Mode (43%)               $0 
25th Percentile               $0 
Median        $1,000 
75th Percentile     $10,000 
90th Percentile      
$20,000 
95th Percentile      
$30,000 
Maximum     $75,000 
Mean           $628 
Mode (81%)               $0 
25th Percentile               $0 
Median                $0 
75th Percentile               $0 
90th Percentile           
$500 
95th Percentile        
$4,798 




Figure 58. BAH on Sea Duty Value Distribution 
 
 















































































































































































Mean        $1,433 
Mode (80%)               $0 
25th Percentile               $0 
Median                $0 
75th Percentile               $0 
90th Percentile        
$5,000 
95th Percentile      
$10,000 
Maximum     $50,000 
Mean        $4,400 
Mode (80%)               $0 
25th Percentile               $0 
Median                $0 
75th Percentile       $5,000 
90th Percentile      
$10,000 
95th Percentile      
$20,000 
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Appendix D. SWO Survey:  Varying Percentile (All 
Positive) Cost Simulation Results 
A. 25% Retention 
 
 














B. 50% Retention 
 
 














C. 75% Retention 
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Appendix E. Enlisted Survey: Varying Percentile 
(All Positive) Cost Simulation Results 
A. 25% Retention 
 
 














B. 50% Retention 
 
 














C. 75% Retention 
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Appendix F. Varying Percentile Cost (High 
Positive) Simulation Results 
A. 25% Retention 
 
 














B. 50% Retention 
 
 














C. 75% Retention 
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Appendix G. Enlisted Varying Percentile Cost 
(High Positive) Simulation Results 
A. 25% Retention 
 
 














B. 50% Retention 
 
 














C. 75% Retention 
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Appendix H. Diversity Charts 
 
Figure 96. Base Case 
All NMIs Offered 


























































































Figure 97. Maximum Increase in Female Representation 
NMIs Offered:  Homeport and Billet. 





























































































Figure 98. Maximum Increase in African-American (Black) 
Representation 
NMIs Offered:  Homeport, Compressed Work Week, Lump-sum SRB 






























































































Figure 99. Maximum Increase in Hispanic Representation 
NMIs Offered:  Platform, 2-tour Geographic Stability, Professional Certification, Lump-sum SRB 





























































































Figure 100. Maximum Increase in Education Representation: 
At or above Associate’s Degree 
NMIs Offered:  Homeport, Platform, Sabbatical, Telecommuting, 
Compressed Week, Barracks Room at Sea, Lump-sum SRB 






























































































Figure 101. Maximum Increase in Generation Y Representation 
NMIs Offered:  Platform, Billet, Sabbatical, Telecommuting, 3-tour Geographic Stability, Professional 
Certification, Compressed Week, Barracks Room at sea, Lump-sum SRB 
 
 






























































































Initial Distribution List 
1. Defense Technical Information Center       2 
8725 John J. Kingman Rd., STE 0944; Ft. Belvoir, VA  22060-6218 
2. Dudley Knox Library, Code 013        2 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5100 
3. Research Office, Code 09          1 
Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA  93943-5138 
4. Bill Gates              1 
Dean, GSBPP 
E-mail: bgates@nps.edu  
5. Pete Coughlan              1 
Associate Professor 








Copies of the Sponsored Research Reports may be printed from our website: 
www.acquisitionresearch.org 
 
